Voices
By Igor Makarov
Europe has made undeniable progress in reducing its dependence on Russian gas. According to data published by the European Council, Russia’s share of EU gas imports fell sharply after 2021, replaced largely by increased LNG supplies and higher volumes from Norway, the United States, Algeria, Qatar, the U.K., and Azerbaijan. This rapid adjustment demonstrated political will, market flexibility, and institutional capacity.
While LNG helped Europe survive, however, it cannot be the entire strategy. LNG is an indispensable flexibility tool, especially in times of crisis; but it is not a strategic replacement for a stable, scalable pipeline supply. Europe still needs to solve its long-term energy security problem.
To move from crisis management to system design, Europe must identify reliable, long-term, non-Russian sources of pipeline gas that are politically diversified and economically viable. From this perspective, one supplier country stands out: Turkmenistan.
Turkmenistan holds the world’s fourth-largest proven natural gas reserves, including the giant Galkynysh field. What it lacks are effective means to bring the gas to market.
Senior economists at the IMF note that Turkmen gas has historically been blocked from reaching Europe by infrastructure and geopolitics rather than economics. In the 1990s, my company ITERA was among the first to connect Turkmen gas with external markets, supplying Ukraine and most other post-Soviet states including, Moldova, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia under extremely difficult economic conditions. That effort ended not because demand disappeared, but because infrastructure access was cut off. In early 2000s, Gazprom’s monopoly over westbound pipeline infrastructure effectively excluded Turkmenistan from European markets, forcing it to redirect exports eastward, primarily to China.
Europe is now actively seeking non-Russian pipeline supply options. Azerbaijan already exports gas to the EU and has proven itself a reliable transit and supplier country. Turkey has consolidated its role as a regional energy hub. The missing link remains the delivery, not because it is technically impossible, but because until now, it has lacked sustained political support and investment leadership.
Past efforts to bring Turkmen gas to market focused on a single “mega-project” – a Trans-Caspian pipeline route that would move Turkmen gas across the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan, onward through Turkey, and into Europe via the existing Southern Gas Corridor. In the mid-1990s, my company ITERA participated in preliminary discussions on this matter. But it never came to fruition.
Thirty years later, there is now a greater political imperative, as well as multiple complementary routes through which Turkmen gas can begin moving westward.
First, Turkmen gas can reach Europe via Azerbaijan and Turkey by integrating into existing Southern Gas Corridor infrastructure. Capacity optimization, and phased expansion could allow early deliveries while larger infrastructure is developed.
Second, swap mechanisms could provide an interim solution. Under such arrangements, Turkmen gas could be delivered to Turkey and onward to European markets. Analysts describe this as a practical workaround that allows modest but meaningful flows without new construction, serving as a bridge until larger projects are realized.
Third, a Turkey-first strategy is already taking shape. According to press reports, Turkmenistan and Turkey have signed agreements to initiate direct gas deliveries using existing pipeline routes, including via swap mechanisms. While these volumes may initially supply Turkey rather than the EU, Turkey is already deeply interconnected with European gas markets. Establishing consistent westbound flows into Turkey creates a commercial and operational foundation for later expansion for Turkey to provide greater flows into the EU.
Fourth, diplomatic energy frameworks among Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Turkey are laying the institutional groundwork for future infrastructure. Memorandums of understanding and political coordination may seem merely symbolic; but in reality, they reduce sovereign risk, align regulatory expectations, and make capital deployment possible when market conditions align.
Taken together, these opportunities form a phased, layered strategy for increasing Europe’s long-term energy security by allowing Turkmen gas to move west organically through multiple mechanisms, rather than waiting for a single perfect solution.
The bottom line is clear: gas flows where politics and infrastructure allow it to flow. Europe now has both the incentive and the leverage to enable a westbound solution for Turkmen gas. Turkmenistan has the reserves. Azerbaijan and Turkey have the geography. What is missing is an integrated political and investment framework – one that recognizes multiple routes, phased execution, and strategic patience.
Europe’s long-term energy security will remain incomplete until this framework exists, and the success of such a framework will depend in part on Europe’s ability to bring Turkmen gas via pipelines to the European market.