Turkish Cypriot journalist Yusuf Kanlı speaks to Politis about Ankara’s interest in the upcoming 'presidential elections' in the Turkish Cypriot community and Turkey’s overall stance on Cyprus. Kanlı has been working in Turkey since 1977, currently serves as Vice President of the Turkish Journalists' Association, and is an Editorial Advisor for the private news agency ANKA. He is widely regarded as a traditional spokesperson for the Turkish government's official line
Is there genuine interest in Turkey regarding the 'presidential elections' in the Turkish Cypriot community?
“There is a natural and ongoing interest in Turkey regarding political developments in the Turkish Cypriot community. For Turkey, the leadership in northern Cyprus is not a local issue - it is directly linked to the Cyprus question, the geopolitics of the Eastern Mediterranean, and even Turkey’s broader relations with the EU, NATO, and its neighbouring countries. Policymakers, diplomats, and the media consistently follow these elections closely. That said, wider public interest tends to grow gradually. These elections rarely make front-page headlines until the final stage. However, as we approach the October elections, attention will inevitably intensify: the dynamics of the campaign, the possibility of a second round, and speculation about Turkey’s influence will likely push the issue higher up the public agenda.
What must be emphasised is that Turkey’s support is not dependent on who wins. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s statements at the UN podium, and his earlier comments during his flight from Doha, reaffirmed that Turkey’s solidarity with the Turkish Cypriot people is unconditional. This is not about personalities or parties - it is about shared history, culture, and identity.”
Erhürman vs Tatar
Does the Turkish government favour one candidate over the other — Tufan Erhürman or Ersin Tatar?
“Historically, Ankara has been more comfortable with leaders like Ersin Tatar, who support the two-state model, in line with Turkey’s current policy. In fact, Turkey’s support was crucial to his 2020 victory. However, ahead of the 2025 elections, Ankara’s official stance remains reserved. Turkish leaders emphasise ‘respect for the will of the Turkish Cypriot people’ and avoid sending overt signals of preference.
Naturally, behind the scenes, Turkey aligns more closely with candidates who advocate sovereign equality, but maintains open dialogue with all actors, including federation-leaning figures like Tufan Erhürman. The key point is this: whoever wins, Turkey’s commitment to the 'TRNC' will not change. Erdoğan has made it explicitly clear - Turkey will stand by the Turkish Cypriots, regardless of the political colour of their leadership. This assurance reflects a bond built on unbreakable brotherhood.”
Is Cyprus a top priority on Turkey’s political agenda?
“Cyprus has always held a prominent place on Turkey’s agenda, even when other crises dominate the daily political narrative. It may not always lead newspaper headlines or evening news broadcasts, but it remains at the core of Ankara’s strategic thinking.
The reason is clear: Cyprus is intrinsically linked to Turkey’s national security, its maritime claims in the Eastern Mediterranean, and its identity as a regional power. It is not an issue that can be sidelined. Erdoğan’s speech at the UN General Assembly once again underlined this reality: Turkey views the Turkish Cypriots as part of its broader regional outlook. Even amid economic turmoil or other regional crises, Cyprus remains a constant pillar of Ankara’s foreign policy.”
The Cyprus Problem
Are there signs of any shift in Turkey’s Cyprus policy?
“There are no indications of a fundamental change. Turkey remains committed to the principle of sovereign equality and a two-state solution, which it views as the only realistic option following the collapse of the federal model at Crans-Montana in 2017.
However, Turkey’s approach is evolving. Ankara is now placing more emphasis on ‘cooperation models’ in areas such as energy, environment, and trade. These do not replace the vision of two states but offer a path for realistic collaboration without requiring formal recognition.
At the same time, it is becoming increasingly clear that neither a rigid federation nor a pure two-state model may provide the ultimate solution. Perhaps a new, hybrid model is needed: two sovereign states forming a loose federation or confederation under an umbrella with very limited powers and competences. Under such a structure, both constituent states would be fully sovereign, with the authority to sign international agreements independently.
If there is genuine interest in peace, stability, and prosperity, all sides must be willing to consider such creative solutions. Only by moving beyond exhausted paradigms can a shared future be built on this island - a future of peace, calm, and prosperity for all. Erdoğan himself has made it clear: Turkey is not bound to any rigid formula, but rather to the rights and dignity of the Turkish Cypriot people.”
The European Path
Does Turkey believe its road to Europe passes through Cyprus?
“Officially, Turkey rejects this cliché. Ankara maintains that its EU accession bid should be judged on its own merits and not be held hostage to the veto of a single member state. However, it recognises the political reality: as long as the Republic of Cyprus is an EU member, it will have influence over Turkey’s European trajectory.
That said, this formula carries less weight today than it did in the early 2000s. The EU no longer dominates Turkey’s political imagination, and Ankara now sees Cyprus less as a European obstacle and more as a matter of sovereignty and security.
Despite economic challenges, Turkey remains a regional power. Yesterday it mattered; today its influence is greater - as seen in Ukraine and across every major flashpoint in the Middle East. Tomorrow, it will be even stronger: with 85 million people, a resilient economy, a rapidly growing defence industry, and proven military strength.
From this perspective, Ankara’s position is firm: Cyprus cannot be used as a veto by a small state to contain a rising regional power. Europe must adapt to the reality of Turkey - not the other way around.”
Nikos Christodoulides
How does Turkey view the government of the Republic of Cyprus and President Christodoulides?
“Turkey does not recognise the Republic of Cyprus and consistently refers to it as the ‘Greek Cypriot administration of southern Cyprus’. It rejects the claim that Nicosia represents the entire island.
From Ankara’s point of view, southern Cyprus has been deliberately transformed into a heavily militarised forward base. Beyond the two British sovereign bases granted under the 1960 agreements, it has opened its territory to France, the United States, Israel, and others. It is purchasing advanced weaponry - most recently, the Israeli Barak MX air defence system - and permits joint exercises and deployments.
Rather than serving as a bridge of cooperation, the island risks becoming a missile zone, exposed to external conflicts. Diplomatically, Nicosia follows a rigid ‘no’ policy, excluding Turkey from energy and regional cooperation platforms. For Ankara, this is like the buzzing of a mosquito — annoying, provocative, but incapable of undermining the fundamental reality that the Turkish Cypriots are co-owners of the island.
As for President Nikos Christodoulides, Ankara sees him as a continuation of a policy of obstruction. His mentor, Nicos Anastasiades, played a particularly destructive role at Crans-Montana in 2017, abandoning the talks in the early morning hours, even though nearly all of his demands had been met - ‘like a criminal fleeing the scene of the crime’. That betrayal convinced Turkey that Greek Cypriot leaders are not ready to accept genuine political equality.
Christodoulides also faces his own credibility issues. The rise of far-right forces in Greek Cypriot politics and his apparent reliance on their political support make him a far less welcome partner in Ankara’s eyes. It is hard to believe that a leader backed by hardliners - who thrive on anti-Turkish rhetoric - could achieve the compromises needed for serious progress.
To Turkey, he appears less like a pragmatic interlocutor and more like a captive of the far-right currents shaping domestic Greek Cypriot politics. Thus, Christodoulides is not seen as a reformer, but rather as the polished face of a rigid and exclusionary policy.
No matter what base he opens or which alliance he joins, Ankara’s compass remains clear: unwavering solidarity with the Turkish Cypriot people. As Erdoğan said in New York and in Doha, Turkey’s support will continue - regardless of who holds power in Nicosia.”
