By Kyriakos Pierides*
The Great Sea Interconnector (GSI) is shaking the governments of Greece and Cyprus, revealing how problematic their relations become over time as long as unresolved issues remain: the Cyprus problem and the maritime disputes between Greece and Turkey. The more the two governments avoid defining a strategy for resolution and keep sweeping everything “under the rug,” the more entangled their relations become and their interests diverge.
The GSI is nothing more than another ambitious energy project that will remain on paper, as it collides with the deadlock of the Cyprus problem, a problem not only unresolved, but one that also generates new fronts and tensions with Turkey.
The Dispute
At this stage, the fate of the GSI, whether it will be implemented or not, is being decided. The two governments quarrel, searching for excuses to withdraw from a project they both know depends on unpredictable factors. “This is a project that will greatly benefit Cyprus, which is energy-isolated. But for the project to go ahead, Cyprus must prove in practice that it wants it,” said Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis at the Thessaloniki International Fair (6 Sep). Two days later (8 Sep), Cyprus President Nikos Christodoulides responded: “The Republic of Cyprus will fulfill the commitments it has undertaken. I hope all those involved in this project will honor their commitments as well.”
Athens accuses Nicosia of stalling by refusing to release the €25 million needed to start laying the cable, while Nicosia casts doubt on the project’s financial logic. But the payment quarrel is a smokescreen. The deeper truth is that the plans lack realism, particularly in addressing the geopolitical elephant in the room: Turkey.
Pipeline and Cable
Another ambitious idea is turning into an illusion. The same happened with the EastMed natural gas pipeline, now quietly forgotten. In 2022, a leaked U.S. non-paper (5 January) was enough to silence the hollow declarations repeated at every trilateral with Israel. Today, the GSI faces the same collision with reality, while “ally” Netanyahu again remains silent.
Grey Zones
Since 2010, events have turned the Eastern Mediterranean into a field of disputes. Large potential Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) areas remain undefined, creating “grey zones”: Cyprus, Rhodes, Kastellorizo, Karpathos, even Crete. Based on what happened off Kasos in July 2024, it can no longer be ruled out that a dangerous naval buildup could occur if GSI cable-laying is attempted. Back then, all parties withdrew after “staking their claims” at sea. What if next time no one pulls back?
On 29 August, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan warned: “We will not hesitate to go to war with them, we will not hesitate to respond to them on any issue… and we have taken our measures.” Greek Foreign Minister Giorgos Gerapetritis responded sharply, saying: “We take instructions from no one.” So far, these remain rhetorical.
Skipping the Hard Part
Turkey sees the Greece–Cyprus–Israel GSI as an attempt to isolate it in the Gulf of Antalya. It insists that energy projects in the Eastern Mediterranean require its consent and participation. Greece and Cyprus agree this would only be possible if political problems are resolved. No one denies this prospect.
Yet instead of focusing on strategies to solve problems, thus opening the surest path to energy projects, the Greek and Cypriot governments have put the cart before the horse. The GSI, like EastMed before it, not only fails to move forward but also widens Turkey’s claims over maritime zones (continental shelf, EEZ). With no agreed delimitations under the Law of the Sea, each side draws its own lines.
Mutual Benefit
The long-standing problems, starting with the Cyprus issue, are infinitely more vital to resolve since they concern territorial occupation, not just disputes over economic rights. Cypriots know that negotiations under the UN are their only path, one they could pursue from a stronger diplomatic position with numerous EU tools at their disposal. One such tool is the design of energy projects of mutual benefit, involving both the EU and Turkey, rather than excluding Turkey in the hope of someday solving the problem.
For Greece, the path is bilateral dialogue on maritime zones, with recourse to the International Court of Justice in The Hague. It could once again attempt to set timelines with the EU for its relations with Turkey, similar to the Helsinki strategy of 1999.
Projects on Paper
The illusion of grandiose energy projects without solving underlying problems is coming to an end. Since 2004, Cyprus first and then Greece have tried for two decades to push them forward, but beyond geopolitical risk, there are also serious technical challenges of depth and distance, leaving them without foreign investors.
In the past 15 years, Cyprus’ drilling program has not yielded sufficient reserves. ExxonMobil’s drilling in early 2025 is the last planned. No new announcements or schedules have been made. Companies are quietly withdrawing.
A Realistic Path
Is it time to consider the alternative path? Greek-Turkish dialogue, which began so promisingly in December 2023 with the Athens Declaration, gave rise to hopes for Cyprus as well. Now it is stalling, and since November 2024 progress on political issues has frozen. Mitsotakis postponed a trip to Ankara, though now he seeks to meet Erdogan in New York at the end of September. Even if Aegean waters remain “calm” conditions have worsened.
In Cyprus, UN efforts to restart talks and build confidence have failed. Instead, tensions are rising in the 180 km buffer zone. Nicosia cultivates a nebulous “security alliance” with Israel, which fuels Turkey’s reaction on the ground, further militarizing the divided island to Ankara’s advantage.
Since early 2025, a new order has emerged with President Trump’s role in Middle East geopolitics, favoring relations with Erdogan. Europeans are unwilling to assume geopolitical risk with Turkey, regardless of the GSI’s EU funding. Germany and France, the EU’s key players, are preoccupied with building a "Coalition of the Willing" for Ukraine, an effort in which Turkey and post-Brexit Britain play pivotal roles.
Against this backdrop, Mitsotakis’ warning of a veto on Turkey’s participation in the SAFE regulation looks more like an admission of weakness than a strong bargaining chip. He said it alone, no one in Europe wants it under current circumstances, and all hope to avoid it. As for Cypriot diplomacy, the less said the better. Christodoulides would be satisfied claiming to engage in talks with the UN on the Cyprus problem, while in practice ensuring nothing moves forward so as not to face dilemmas.
*Kyriacos Pierides, Communucation Specialist
