By Kriton Kapsalis
The internal DISY poll, whose broad findings were published by Phileleftheros and whose detailed tables were revealed yesterday by Politis, does not determine the outcome of the 2028 presidential election. It does, however, shed light on the central political equation that is now beginning to take shape.
Annita Demetriou emerges as DISY's strongest option and the only candidate tested who succeeds in reaching the second round. In a scenario against Andreas Mavroyiannis and Nikos Christodoulides, Mavroyiannis leads with 30%, Demetriou follows with 26%, while the President of the Republic is limited to 24%. With Averof Neophytou (15%) or Giorgos Pamborides (14%) as the DISY candidate, Nikos Christodoulides reaches the second round with a double-digit lead at 28%.
Naturally, the poll reflects current trends rather than future realities. It cannot predict developments in the economy, the Cyprus issue, government fatigue, the alliances that may emerge before 2028, or how public opinion will respond to the first woman running for the Presidency of the Republic. Nevertheless, it suggests that the battle for second place could become a contest between the DISY leader and Nikos Christodoulides, with the centre-left candidate having strong prospects of reaching the runoff. In such a scenario, DIKO could hold the key to the centre-right vote, although parties such as Direct Democracy, ALMA and Volt cannot be ignored.
DIKO as kingmaker
With roughly 10% of the vote and eight seats in the new parliament, DIKO has maintained its position as a key force in the political centre. It now shares the role of kingmaker with ELAM, which also holds eight seats. At the same time, it remains the only parliamentary party formally participating in the Christodoulides government.
The numbers make DIKO valuable to any centre-right presidential candidate. That does not mean, however, that its leadership can simply transfer all of its voters to whichever candidate it chooses to endorse.
In the poll in question, even with both DIKO and ELAM supporting Nikos Christodoulides from the first round, the incumbent President, on 26%, still loses to both Annita Demetriou (27%) and Andreas Mavroyiannis (34%), failing to qualify for the runoff. Christodoulides also misses out on the second round, with 27%, in a scenario where Stefanos Stefanou secures 28% and Annita Demetriou also records 28%.
What could DIKO do if it backed Christodoulides and he failed to reach the runoff? There is, of course, the second round to consider. But the real question for DIKO concerns the first round and is not primarily about which of Annita Demetriou or Nikos Christodoulides is more likely to win.
The key political question is what DIKO wants to become over the next decade: a party preparing its own presidential bid, or a stable partner within a broader centre-right alliance.
Christodoulides has the ministries
Support for Nikos Christodoulides currently appears the most likely option, unless the many polls expected over the coming months change the picture.
Christodoulides represents continuity. DIKO invested in his candidacy in 2023, contributed decisively to his election and participates in his government. A cabinet reshuffle that further strengthens the party's representation would provide more government posts, greater access to executive power and the opportunity to present tangible achievements to its voters.
Reports suggest that the Presidential Palace has recognised DIKO's upgraded role and the need for greater participation in policymaking. The problem, however, is that ministerial positions do not automatically fix a political relationship.
In recent months, Nikolas Papadopoulos has repeatedly raised concerns about coordination, consultation and DIKO's meaningful participation in decision-making. Party sources have even described the President's attitude towards the party secretariat as arrogant, while dissatisfaction with the functioning of the coalition government has been openly expressed.
Within DIKO, there is a perception that Christodoulides long believed he would eventually secure DISY's support. This reduced his need to treat DIKO as an equal political partner. Even in discussions surrounding the cabinet reshuffle, the Presidency appeared particularly careful to retain figures with strong ties to the DISY camp, given that DISY voters remain crucial to any 2028 strategy.
DIKO must therefore ask itself what happens after a re-election, if Christodoulides is re-elected. Additional ministerial positions today may serve as a political down payment for support in 2028. Once Christodoulides secures a second term, however, his need to negotiate with DIKO will diminish. The behaviour repeatedly criticised by Nikolas Papadopoulos could return, this time without the incentive of seeking re-election.
There is, however, a significant strategic advantage. Christodoulides can serve only one more consecutive term, since the Constitution limits presidents to two consecutive terms. If he is re-elected in 2028, the Presidency will be open in 2033.
If DIKO and Nikolas Papadopoulos are planning a presidential bid of their own in 2033, Christodoulides, despite the difficulties in their relationship, is the candidate who cannot stand against them in the following election. He might even prove to be a useful ally.
The ELAM complication
Remaining in the Christodoulides camp, however, forces DIKO to contend with the ELAM factor.
The two parties now hold the same number of parliamentary seats, yet they are moving along different electoral trajectories. ELAM has already made inroads into sections of DIKO's traditionally conservative and nationally sensitive voter base, and aspires to establish itself as the dominant force to the right of DISY.
Without support from Pindarou, Christodoulides will need votes from the centre, the right and the far right. This would push DIKO into an unavoidable electoral coexistence, or even occasional tactical alignment, with ELAM.
For DIKO, this is a risky relationship. ELAM is not merely a potential partner. It is a direct competitor for the same voters. Any move that legitimises or elevates ELAM's role could further strengthen its electoral appeal at DIKO's expense, particularly if Christodoulides needs ELAM's backing from the first round, forcing him to offer significant political concessions to Christos Christou.
A strategic alliance with Annita
Backing Annita Demetriou offers a different perspective, centred on building a broader centre-right bloc anchored by DISY and DIKO, without dependence on a privileged relationship with ELAM.
Beyond the House presidency, DIKO could negotiate from the outset a programme-based agreement on the Cyprus issue, the economy, social policy and participation in government. It would become a co-founder of a new political majority rather than merely a partner of a re-elected president.
At the same time, such an alliance would allow DIKO to reposition itself within the traditional centre-right space and stem voter losses to ELAM, an objective that DISY is equally eager to achieve.
The choice, however, could come at a considerable cost.
If Annita Demetriou wins in 2028 and seeks two terms in office, she could dominate the political space until 2038. DIKO would participate in a powerful alliance but would struggle to mount its own presidential bid in 2033, if such aspirations exist.
Moreover, DISY is a much larger party, creating the risk that it could politically absorb its smaller partner. Demetriou already possesses centrist credentials and an ability to appeal directly to DIKO voters. A long-term partnership might provide governmental stability while gradually weakening DIKO's distinct political identity.
The choice depends on 2033
Ultimately, DIKO's dilemma is not really about 2028. It is primarily about 2033.
If the party wants to contest the Presidency then with its own candidate, Nikos Christodoulides is the most convenient strategic option. He would provide another presidential term in which DIKO remains part of government and would then leave the presidential stage.
The price would be that DIKO would have to tolerate an unequal relationship, become fully associated with government wear and tear, and politically coexist with an ELAM that directly threatens its electoral base.
If, on the other hand, DIKO has no intention of seeking the Presidency in 2033, Annita Demetriou offers a cleaner and more long-term strategy. Over time, such a course could lead to the creation of a coherent centre-right bloc, less dependent on the far right and built on a clearer policy platform.
The final decision will reveal what DIKO truly wants.
If Nikolas Papadopoulos is not already thinking about a presidential run in 2033, the choice may be far easier than it currently appears.
