Recognising Türkiye’s regional importance does not mean endorsing every policy pursued by Ankara. Yet it is equally unrealistic to imagine that a workable regional order can be established while disregarding Türkiye’s weight. Its industry, market, transport connections, military capabilities and diplomatic reach give it a direct influence on the security and prosperity of neighbouring countries. A partnership grounded in mutual respect can deliver tangible benefits to those neighbours.
That is the fundamental choice in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean: put Türkiye’s capabilities to work for the common good, or keep the region in perpetual tension by trying to contain it. Ankara should respect its neighbours’ rights. Those neighbours must also take Türkiye’s legitimate interests and security concerns seriously. A relationship that satisfies one side’s expectations while continually postponing the other’s interests cannot endure.
Friendship with Türkiye brings tangible benefits
Good relations with Türkiye have economic and strategic value beyond diplomatic courtesy. Partnerships in trade, tourism, energy, ports, logistics and manufacturing can expand opportunities across the region. Türkiye’s connections with Europe, the Black Sea, the Caucasus and the Middle East also offer its neighbours access to wider markets.
When discussing possible settlements in Cyprus, we frequently encounter a naive question from foreign diplomats: “What would the Greek Cypriots gain? Why should they share government, the island’s resources and sovereignty with the Turkish Cypriot people?” This approach treats partnership as a favour one side would bestow on the other, overlooking the substantial gains a settlement could unlock. Opening Türkiye’s ports, airports and large market to the whole of Cyprus through a comprehensive settlement could transform the island’s prospects in trade, tourism, transport, investment and energy. Friendly relations with Türkiye, potentially even an alliance founded on mutual trust, could bring both Cypriot peoples and Greece economic and strategic benefits far beyond those available today. A settlement should be assessed through the prosperity and security it could create together, as well as the distribution of existing powers.
Not every disagreement must be resolved before this potential can be developed. Tangible shared gains can make difficult issues easier to discuss. But Türkiye’s openness to cooperation does not mean it will accept every arrangement. Those seeking Ankara’s contribution undermine partnership when they treat its interests as obstacles to overcome. Türkiye, in turn, must respect its neighbours’ right to make their own decisions and address their security needs.
The Aegean balance cannot be changed unilaterally
The Aegean has a distinctive geography, with closely situated coastlines and numerous islands. The breadth of territorial waters is therefore much more than a technical matter. It affects sovereignty, the extent of international waters and the security balance. Türkiye’s concerns arise from these practical consequences.
Extending Greek territorial waters in the Aegean to 12 nautical miles would increase their coverage from approximately 40 percent to more than 70 percent of the sea. For Ankara, that would fundamentally alter the existing balance. Türkiye cannot be expected to regard such a change as merely its neighbour’s domestic concern.
An extension would not eliminate every right of passage. Nevertheless, reducing international waters and changing the pattern of sovereignty off Türkiye’s coastline are consequential developments. Türkiye cannot be shut out of the Aegean, and Greece must also be able to live securely. These objectives can be reconciled through negotiations that address both countries’ needs, rather than unilateral measures intended to settle legal disagreements.
Address the dispute behind the casus belli
The Turkish parliament’s resolution of June 8, 1995, responded to the possibility that Greece might extend its Aegean territorial waters beyond six nautical miles. Because its authorisation included military measures, it is widely known as a warning of casus belli, or grounds for war. Ankara regards it as a warning intended to protect fundamental interests; Athens views it as a threat of war against the exercise of a sovereign right.
Moving beyond this dispute requires more than demanding that the warning be withdrawn. The concerns that produced it must also be addressed. Ankara, for its part, should ensure that deterrence does not replace diplomacy. The purpose should be to prevent unilateral actions from creating conditions that increase the risk of war.
Türkiye’s message should be clear: We are ready to negotiate and seek equitable solutions, but we will not accept fundamental changes to our disadvantage while dialogue continues. Mistaking a willingness to negotiate for weakness is a dangerous miscalculation. Resolve should not be confused with a desire for war, nor compromise with surrender.
Geography matters in the Eastern Mediterranean
Türkiye has the longest mainland coastline in the Eastern Mediterranean. That does not give it rights over the entire sea, but the length and position of its coastline cannot be disregarded in maritime delimitation. Ankara cannot be expected to accept proposals that severely restrict the maritime reach of its southern coast simply because someone has drawn them on a map.
Islands have rights. However, entitlement to maritime zones and the weight an island receives when boundaries are drawn between opposing coasts are different questions. International courts consider geographical circumstances in seeking an equitable outcome. Assuming that every island automatically receives full effect does not remove the need for that assessment.
Türkiye’s rights do not extinguish those of its neighbours, and the reverse is equally true. Presenting Ankara’s exclusion from energy and transport projects as regional cooperation is unconvincing. Leaving a major coastal state outside decisions about the Mediterranean’s future does not produce stability.
Alliances have consequences
Israel, Greece and Cyprus have the right to cooperate. Their commitment at the December 2025 summit to strengthen security, defence and military relations demonstrates the scope of their partnership. Its significance for Türkiye, however, depends more on its practical consequences than on public declarations. Ankara cannot be expected to regard a structure that excludes it as a project for peace.
The militarisation of Aegean islands cannot be separated from this assessment. Ankara argues that military restrictions imposed by the Lausanne and Paris treaties are being violated on the islands concerned. Athens advances different legal interpretations and invokes defence requirements. The islands are not all governed by identical provisions, but Türkiye’s concern about military deployments across from its shores is understandable. Those demanding respect for treaties should take their military restrictions seriously too.
Weapons purchases from Israel deepen these concerns. The 36 PULS rocket artillery systems whose acquisition Greece approved can reach targets up to 300 kilometres away, depending on the ammunition used. Such strike capabilities cannot be assessed solely as a protective shield. Risk is measured through range, deployment and operational plans, rather than the label attached to a system.
Greece’s approximately €3 billion air defence agreement with Israel and the Greek Cypriot acquisition of Barak MX systems form part of the same picture. Air defence alone does not establish offensive intent. Combined with strike systems, joint exercises and rhetoric depicting Türkiye as a threat, however, it creates capabilities that Ankara must take into account.
Expanded American access to military facilities and defence partnerships with France also strengthen the external support available to Athens and Cyprus. These agreements differ in their nature and scope. External support contributes to stability when it encourages compromise; it increases tension when it nurtures the belief that more confrontational steps against Türkiye can be taken safely.
Language that demonises Türkiye or normalises fantasies of military confrontation and rapid victory also erodes negotiations. Responsible rhetoric is required on both shores. Those who expect encirclement to extract concessions should consider whether it will produce the opposite result. Ankara has the capacity to develop responses to pressure. Its pursuit of cooperation is not a pledge to retreat.
The Turkish Cypriot people’s rights cannot be removed from this equation. Arrangements excluding their effective participation in resources and regional projects make a settlement harder. Cooperation benefiting both peoples should take precedence over attempts to secure an advantage through outside alliances.
Syria’s recovery is a shared opportunity
Syria’s reconstruction and the restoration of its sovereignty throughout its territory should not, in themselves, be regarded as threats by any neighbour. A Syria with functioning institutions is a safer neighbour than one fragmented by armed groups and foreign intervention. Türkiye’s contribution to its recovery cannot automatically be labelled expansionism.
Ankara’s interest lies in the emergence of a state capable of governing its territory, rather than a vacuum on its southern border that continually generates crises. Trade, infrastructure, employment and safe, voluntary refugee returns benefit both countries. Gulf capital and Türkiye’s manufacturing and logistics capabilities can complement one another. Protecting Kurdish rights, ensuring every community’s security and integrating armed formations into national institutions through agreement would strengthen the social foundations of Syrian sovereignty.
Israel’s security concerns deserve consideration, but they do not justify keeping Syria indefinitely weak. Regional statements joined by Türkiye have emphasised that attacks on Syria and violations of its sovereignty undermine stability.
Damascus’s vulnerabilities must not be treated as opportunities, particularly by Israel, to acquire territory or establish permanent spheres of influence. Exploiting a neighbour’s weakness does not create lasting security. Partnership with Türkiye must likewise avoid dependency, preserving Damascus’s authority over its decisions and its freedom to work with different partners.
Learn from history without perpetuating hostility
The Republic of Türkiye, established after the War of Independence ended the Greek occupation, has not declared war on Greece since its founding. It is a historical fact that the Ottoman Empire declared war on Greece in 1897. But Ottoman conflicts and the foreign policy of the Turkish Republic should be assessed separately.
The Megali Idea and the occupation of Anatolia should not be forgotten. Yet past expansionist projects should not be attributed to Greek society as a whole today. Türkiye does not need dreams of conquest to defend its rights. I hope the same sense of responsibility prevails across the water.
Ankara and Athens can open another path
The disagreements are serious, but they are not insoluble. The commitment to dialogue reiterated by the two leaders in February 2026 should translate into restraint against unilateral moves, continued military communication and broader cooperation. Progress in trade, tourism, disaster response and migration can make negotiations on difficult issues easier.
Türkiye’s friendship offers substantial opportunities; excluding it and confining it to its shores carries costs. Ankara’s call for cooperation should be taken seriously, and its resolve should not be misread. Türkiye cannot be expected to turn its back on the Aegean and Mediterranean. Lasting peace can be built together with Türkiye.
