The Attorney General has again voiced strong disagreement with provisions in the bills that would separate the powers of the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General. In a written note to the House Finance Committee, submitted ahead of discussion on the Legal Service’s 2026 budget, he reiterates his reservations.
While stating respect for the political will to proceed with a separation of powers, the Attorney General explained that he signed the bills despite holding a different view, which he says is protected by the institutional independence of his office. He repeats the concerns already placed on record during meetings of the House Legal Affairs Committee. His objections relate to both the policy rationale and the constitutionality of the proposed changes.
Policy objections in summary
• No study has been presented demonstrating that the proposed reform of the Attorney General’s institution would operate more effectively or resolve the problems the government aims to address.
• There is no assessment of the long-term fiscal cost of the reform for the state, a matter that warrants scrutiny.
• Alternative proposals could be put forward that would avoid constitutional reservations.
Constitutional concerns
The Attorney General argues that the proposed constitutional amendment would create additional legal uncertainty as to whether the new offices of Public Prosecutor General and Deputy Public Prosecutor General, which would decide on criminal prosecutions, fit within the constitutional framework.
He stresses that any constitutional amendment must not affect fundamental structures or institutions that touch upon basic rights or statehood. In his view, the manner in which the separation is proposed is drastic and could impinge upon the core of the 1960 Constitution. He cites Article 112.1, which provides for two officers, the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General, one from each community due to the bi-communal character of the Constitution, both competent over all defined powers. It does not envisage splitting legal competences between them through non-fundamental provisions.
He further contends that the proposed arrangements alter the meaning and intent of the Constitution in a way that effectively substitutes the constituent legislator’s will. The Doctrine of Necessity, he notes, is a last resort for situations that make it objectively impossible for state organs to function in accordance with constitutional provisions. It is not a means to bypass the Constitution, nor an escape from its constraints. In any case, the Doctrine of Necessity does not permit direct or indirect amendment of fundamental articles, as it exists to uphold the Constitution, not overturn it.