The top ranks of the National Guard remain blocked, with the problem particularly acute at lower levels among permanent non-commissioned officers (NCOs) who have been stuck in the same rank, and consequently the same pay grade, for years. The stagnation in promotions not only dampens morale within the force but also causes financial harm, as many NCOs fail to advance within the age limits that would secure them higher lump-sum payments and pensions.
Permanent NCOs who spoke to Politis said that the commitments made by the state during the adoption of the 2017 Regulations were never implemented. The promise of mass promotions was not fulfilled, nor was a credible plan put in place to ease the congestion in the National Guard’s hierarchy. On the contrary, stagnation has deepened, to the point that a special arrangement is now considered necessary.
What went wrong?
In the past, career progression followed a predictable pattern: five years as sergeant, five as staff sergeant, five as master sergeant, and then promotion to warrant officer or second lieutenant, depending on the needs of the National Guard. The rank of warrant officer carried a pay scale of A8–A9–A10, offering clear professional and financial advancement.
However, the mass recruitment of permanent NCOs, whether as graduates of military schools, through direct appointments, or via the regularisation of volunteers without corresponding adjustments in the command structure, led to gridlock in promotions and persistent congestion.
In 2005, the situation worsened when permanent NCOs lost the right to be promoted to officer rank, closing off a key incentive for career advancement and financial improvement.
Only 100 promotions in six years
According to NCOs who spoke to Politis, between 2011 and 2016 only 100 permanent NCOs were promoted, a number that reveals how deep the stagnation ran even before the 2017 Regulations were enacted. The limited number of promotions was not the result of the financial crisis or austerity measures, since officer promotions continued as normal, but stemmed from the insufficient number of positions provided for in the state budget.
While the 2017 Regulations aimed to improve career flow, they in practice institutionalised stagnation, which continues to this day.
In 2015, the National Guard had 513 permanent sergeant posts, 601 staff sergeants, 349 master sergeants and 129 warrant officers. Between 2016 and 2017, the number of sergeants increased to 570, without any change at higher ranks, causing a bottleneck at the base of the hierarchy.
When the new Regulations took effect in 2018, the first adjustments were made: sergeants were reduced to 500, staff sergeants remained at 600, and warrant officers were split into three categories: A (21), B (105), and C (85).
In 2019, sergeants were further reduced to 430, staff sergeants remained at 600, while C-category warrant officers rose to 153 and B-category to 130.
The most significant restructuring came in 2020: sergeants dropped to 369 and staff sergeants to 461, while master sergeants increased to 510 and C-category warrant officers to 254. In 2022, staff sergeants were reduced again to 400, with other ranks remaining unchanged.
Stagnation amid absent measures
These adjustments did not resolve the stagnation affecting permanent NCOs, largely because the possibility of surplus (overstrength) promotions was never legislated. Without such a mechanism, even the non-promotion of a single officer can halt the progression of others, creating a chain reaction of paralysis throughout the ranks.
The State has already introduced surplus promotion mechanisms in several sectors to avoid such deadlocks and prevent posts from remaining vacant. Examples include:
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Public Service (Law 1/1990, Article 43): Surplus appointments or promotions when no suitable candidates exist.
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Police (Law 73(I)/2004, Article 18): Surplus promotions up to the rank of Senior Superintendent, on recommendation of the Chief and approval of the Minister of Justice.
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Fire Service (Law 100(I)/2021, Article 21): Surplus promotions up to the rank of Fire Officer, on recommendation of the competent committee and approval of the Minister of Justice.
In contrast, the Army of the Republic lacks any similar provision. The only relevant clause (Article 29A of the National Guard Law) allows for surplus appointments of second lieutenants or sergeants solely for the placement of graduatesfrom military academies.
The absence of a surplus promotion provision has led to chronic stagnation, with personnel remaining in the same ranks far beyond the intended periods. Worse still, when a member is deemed “retained” and no other candidates are available, the post remains vacant, blocking the advancement of lower-ranked officers who meet the criteria for promotion.
NCOs told Politis that 2024 saw, for the first time, vacancies caused by the erroneous expiry of the transitional clause in Article 46(5). That clause, in force for six years, allowed C-category warrant officers to be assessed under special criteria (15 years of service). Once it expired, officers previously deemed suitable were excluded the following year, while others promoted within the transition period advanced.
The current pay structure for permanent NCOs is as follows:
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Sergeants – A5 (2nd level) and A6(ii)
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Staff Sergeants – A7(ii)
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Master Sergeants – A8(i)
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Warrant Officers C – A9
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Warrant Officers B – A10
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Warrant Officers A – A11
Proposals put forth
The NCO Association believes the problem of promotion stagnation can be resolved permanently if the following measures are adopted:
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Define a clear policy stance: The State must take a definitive position on the institution of permanent NCOs. If it truly intends to maintain and strengthen it, it has a duty to protect and support it, and to ensure the conditions for its proper functioning. Recognition of the stagnation problem must be followed by decisive policy and administrative action.
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Restructure established posts: Alternative scenarios should be explored for adjusting the number of posts per rank, with the goal of achieving smoother and fairer career progression. The Association has already produced a study outlining the required changes per rank and per year.
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Establish a fixed timetable: A binding annual promotion schedule should be introduced, monitored by a designated committee.
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Activate secondary pay grades: Secondary levels within scales A8(ii), A9(ii), A10(ii) and A11(ii) should be activated to avoid long-term pay stagnation and allow fair, gradual financial progression.
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Legislate surplus promotions: Surplus promotions should be explicitly provided for, following the models used in the Civil Service, Police and Fire Service, to address stagnation effectively.
Defence ministry acknowledges problem
In a letter dated 2 October 2025, Defence Minister Vasilis Palmas informed DISY MP Giorgos Karoullas that the ministry has already prepared a study aimed at improving career progression for both officers and NCOs. The study will soon be submitted to the Ministry of Finance for comments and approval.
In his letter to Parliament, Mr Palmas wrote:
“The Ministry of Defence has identified the issue of abnormal career progression among certain groups within the National Guard. This is a longstanding problem that negatively affects both the individual advancement of personnel and the operational efficiency of the force.
Over the past ten years, no action was taken to resolve it, resulting in overcrowding of personnel at specific ranks. To address this issue, and to improve promotion rates for both officers and NCOs, the Ministry has prepared a study which will shortly be submitted to the Ministry of Finance for review and approval.”
This development is considered highly significant, as it marks the first official acknowledgment by the Defence Ministry of the stagnation problem, and signals political will to adopt corrective measures after nearly a decade of inaction.
The financial aspect
In concluding his letter, Minister Palmas assured Parliament that:
“All actions of the Ministry of Defence aim to ensure meritocracy, transparency and equal treatment, based on the available promotion posts, so that each member of the force can advance according to their abilities and qualifications.”
He also stressed that any changes to the promotion system must take into account the financial dimension of the issue. Any solution, he said, must be fiscally sustainable, ensure optimal use of available resources, and avoid undue strain on public finances.