By Neophytos Loizides from the University of Warwick
As tensions rise once again in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, Cyprus is quietly returning to the centre of strategic debate. The growing involvement of European and international actors in the region highlights a simple but often overlooked reality: no Cyprus settlement can endure without a credible system of security – and no security system can be considered complete without resolving Cyprus itself.
In this shifting landscape, the question of the UK’s Sovereign Base Areas is also re-emerging, not as a technical detail but as a political variable that could shape the outcome of future negotiations. Maintaining the bases under their current framework – as envisaged, for instance, in the Annan Plan – could become a liability in a future referendum.
Yet the same issue could be renegotiated. If the bases were embedded within a broader, internationally credible and politically neutral security architecture, they could instead become part of the solution. The United Kingdom, facing competing strategic pressures from Ukraine to the Indo-Pacific (even a new threat at the Falkland islands), would have its own incentives to support such an adjustment – including cost-sharing, reduced unilateral exposure, and the opportunity to anchor its role within a wider multilateral framework.
Such an approach could combine three elements: shared financial responsibility, balanced commitments involving Greece and Turkey that support regional cooperation, and the inclusion of third-party partners seen as credible by both communities.
Experimental public opinion research conducted among Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots also supports a rethinking of security arrangements. Conjoint surveys allow citizens to evaluate complete settlement packages rather than abstract dimensions, revealing which combinations of provisions generate overall support.
Surveys offer starting points in negotiation rather than certainty – a way to identify configurations that all sides can realistically accept and in Cyprus contrary to the conventional narrative of irreconcilable preferences, there is significant convergence between the two communities, particularly on the role of international and third-party security actors.
One pathway would be a European security core, involving a group of EU states – such as Ireland, Germany and France – acting as implementation partners under a UN mandate. Their role would focus on monitoring compliance, supporting new institutions, and contributing to a peace implementation force. Such an approach would embed Cyprus within a European security ecosystem without introducing new unilateral dependencies.
A second option would involve a NATO-supported stability framework, not in the traditional sense of alliance guarantees, but as a technical and operational pillar within a UN-led system. Under such a “NATO+” model, the alliance could contribute to security sector reform, crisis-prevention mechanisms and operational support. This would allow Cyprus to benefit from NATO expertise while avoiding the political sensitivities associated with direct guarantees – and would align with emerging European debates on defence cooperation (because of internal preferences but also new doctrines emerging in Europe, Cyprus will contribute strictly on the defensive side).
A third option could look beyond Europe focusing on Asia-Pacific democracies – including Japan, Australia and Canada. These actors, lacking direct involvement in Eastern Mediterranean disputes, are often perceived as more neutral. A multinational force involving such countries could support implementation, guarantee neutrality, and act as a bridge between European and global security frameworks (think of the advantages of Japan for its own security risks).
What unites these options is a departure from the logic of unilateral guarantees and post-colonial security arrangements. Instead, they are grounded in multilateralism, shared responsibility and institutional embedding (i.e. entitlements of any third countries could be revoked if they don’t meet their obligations towards the agreement). Comparative experience shows that such models are more resilient: when multiple actors are invested in implementation, the risks – and the costs of failure – are distributed.
While existing public opinion research in Cyprus has not yet explicitly incorporated the future of the UK bases, it does indicate that within the context of a comprehensive settlement, multilateral arrangements of this kind could attract broad support – even majorities – in both communities. This is a credible starting point for any negotiations. The Cyprus Peace Settlement Scenario Toolkit (PCSST) enables readers access to our data including the ability to rework themselves peace settlement scenarios and test their acceptance in the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. In partnership with several academic and research institutions, the toolkit reworks the results of our surveys to produce concise visual maps of cross-community preferences based on packages selected by users including the three security options above.