The new initiative by United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres creates another window of opportunity for the Cyprus problem. Whether or not it leads to a substantive restart, it reminds us of a fundamental truth: no peace process can succeed in the long term without social legitimacy. Agreements are negotiated by leaders, but peace is built by societies. The Secretary-General's threefold emphasis on substance, process and confidence-building measures was examined in our recent study of a representative sample of the Greek Cypriot community (N = 824), drawn from the online panel of the University of Cyprus's University Centre for Field Studies (UCFS). The sample was weighted by district, age and gender on the basis of the official 2021 census. Data collection was completed between 10 and 31 July 2026 and was coordinated by Dr Andria Nicolaou under the supervision of Prof. Charis Psaltis, director of UCFS. The research was funded by the ORA 7 research programme INCLUSIVEPEACE, led by Prof. Neophytos Loizides.
Is society ready?
Whenever the discussion reopens, the same questions return. Is society ready? Is there still support for a settlement? How well informed are citizens? What concerns them most? Which elements of a possible agreement do they consider acceptable, and which do they reject?
Although these questions shape the prospects of success for any political initiative, they are often answered through personal assessments, fragmented opinion polls or political impressions. We hear that "society is not ready", that "young people do not care" or that "federation has been rejected". But how much of this is supported by systematic research evidence, and how much consists of rumours or assumptions repeated so often that they begin to seem self-evident?
This need gave rise to the Bicommunal Relations Observatory for the Cyprus Problem: a platform providing information on published academic articles and recent research findings from representative and other studies in both communities in Cyprus, available at https://cpsaltis-max.github.io/Bicommunal_Relations_Observatory/. Its aim is to inform the public objectively about Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot attitudes and perceptions concerning intercommunal relations and the Cyprus problem. Its ambition is neither to tell citizens what they should believe nor to promote a party-political position. Its purpose is simpler but also more demanding: to document, with scientific rigour, what members of the two communities who would be entitled to vote in a possible future referendum on resolving the Cyprus problem actually believe today. What do they know, what do they not know, what do they hope for, what do they want, and what worries them?
The platform contains 20 years of representative sample survey data from our research programme. With today's publication, we begin a series of interventions on the current state of Greek Cypriot public opinion, based on a study completed between 10 and 31 July 2026.
This study was conducted with a nationwide sample of Greek Cypriots and uses questionnaire design and sampling methods applied internationally in political science and social psychology research. In addition to standard attitudinal questions, it includes questions on knowledge of a Bizonal Bicommunal Federation (BBF), assessments of earlier negotiating convergences, hopes and concerns about a possible settlement, preferences regarding the process, and intercommunal relations.
The study's basic premise is that attitudes towards the Cyprus problem cannot be reduced to a single question. Citizens may regard more than one form of settlement as acceptable or tolerable; they may assess the current status quo and the body of negotiating achievements differently; and they may simultaneously hold particular hopes and concerns. The analysis therefore examines these dimensions separately before bringing them together in an integrated interpretation.
Beginning with substance, how are the status quo, a Bizonal Bicommunal Federation, a unitary state and a two-state solution evaluated? How familiar are citizens with the BBF, and how do they assess the outcome of the Crans-Montana convergences?
Turning to process, do Greek Cypriots want negotiations to resume, and precisely how should this happen?
With regard to confidence-building measures, the study focused on contact between the two communities and its relationship with prejudice reduction, an issue directly related to the opening of additional crossing points as a CBM but we also discuss other possible CBMs on the basis of other recent bicommunal research findings.
Society rejects the current impasse - but which settlement does it accept?
One of the most persistent assumptions in public debate is that Greek Cypriot society has moved away from the prospect of an agreement. At times we hear that citizens have become reconciled to the present situation. Turkey sometimes argues that the Bizonal Bicommunal Federation is dead, or that any new process would encounter a society that is tired and indifferent.
The results of the recent study do not support this simplistic picture. They reveal a society that overwhelmingly regards the current status quo as unjust, yet has not converged on a single view of what should replace it. The first striking finding is that 92.4% of respondents consider the current status quo unjust. The absence of a settlement is not perceived as a neutral condition or as a safe haven without consequences. For the great majority, today's reality embodies both fundamental injustice and instability.
The responses show that society does not operate with one exclusive choice. In differing proportions, sizeable groups say that they accept, or could tolerate if necessary, a Bizonal Bicommunal Federation, a unitary state and even continuation of the status quo, despite the fact that an overwhelming majority assesses it as unjust. One noteworthy feature of Greek Cypriot public opinion is that during periods of tension and risk of a Greek-Turkish confrontation, such as in 2020, research data show a marked increase in rejection of the status quo (79.4%), whereas rejection declines during calmer periods in the Aegean.
When citizens were asked to evaluate different forms of settlement, a Bizonal Bicommunal Federation was accepted or at least tolerated by 75.3%. The corresponding figure for a unitary state was 70.3%, while continuation of the status quo reached 59.1%. By contrast, only 33.3% said they could accept or tolerate a two-state solution.
This finding does not mean that three out of four Greek Cypriots desire a BBF with equal enthusiasm. The study distinguishes between active acceptance and tolerance. This distinction is crucial: a peace process does not require everyone to regard an agreement as ideal. It does, however, require enough people to be able to accept it as better than the available alternatives.
The high level of acceptance of a unitary state also requires careful interpretation. It shows that many citizens evaluate possible settlements through criteria of unity, equality among citizens and the restoration of normality. This aspiration can coexist with the practical acceptance of a federal compromise, although a unitary state is clearly not among the realistic options discussed over many years: it is rejected by the majority of Turkish Cypriots and, unlike the BBF, is not supported by UN resolutions. For anyone who has followed trends in Greek Cypriot acceptance of a unitary state over time, it is also noteworthy that this is the first year in which it has ranked second in acceptance, below BBF (see https://cyprus-solution-landscape-ai-fqtppmt23fqxz93nq9dfre.streamlit.app/).
The picture regarding two states is clearer. Despite Turkey's insistence on this option following the failure at Crans-Montana in 2017, it continues to attract far less social acceptance than the other models. This weakens the claim that society is moving inexorably towards accepting permanent partition. At the same time, we must not overlook the fact that the realities created by separation are becoming increasingly entrenched on the ground over time.
But how much do citizens know about the BBF?
The picture is more complex than the impression of widespread ignorance suggests. A total of 84.9% say they know at least to some extent what a Bizonal Bicommunal Federation is, while 54.4% believe that they know it fairly or very well.
A different picture emerges when citizens are asked to judge the fairness of the Crans-Montana convergences. In all, 29.1% say that they do not know enough to evaluate them. Among those expressing a substantive judgement, 43.5% consider the convergences fair and 56.5% consider them unfair. The two fair/unfair percentages refer only to respondents who took a position, while the 29.1% is calculated across everyone who answered the question. The finding highlights the difference between general familiarity with the concept of a BBF and knowledge or evaluation of the specific body of negotiating achievements. It also underlines the need to inform the public about the 2017 convergences.
Social acceptance clearly does not depend only on the name given to a settlement. It depends on the credibility of its design and crucially its implementation: how decisions will be made, how deadlocks will be addressed, and which mechanisms will guarantee implementation. Institutional safeguards, the so-called backstops and arbitration mechanisms for resolving deadlocks, are therefore not a technical luxury. They are a precondition for trust. Together with colleagues, we have developed relevant proposals that the United Nations has put to the two sides in some form as a way out of the current stalemate. The proposals are available at https://50shadesoffederalism.com/case-studies/unlocking-the-cyprus-peace-process-backstops-could-be-an-option/.
A related issue is voting intention in a possible referendum based on a BBF. As the chart below shows, 34.8% lean towards or are certain to vote Yes, 41.5% are undecided, and 23.7% lean towards or are certain to vote No.
According to our study, most of the middle group of undecided respondents (41.5%) could move towards Yes if some of their concerns, chiefly about implementation of a BBF settlement, were addressed. Will the state function? Will there be deadlocks? Will agreements be honoured? Will rights be protected? The implementation architecture of the settlement and the presence of deadlock-resolution mechanisms are therefore just as important as the settlement's content and the confidence-building measures.
The real question, however, is not simply which settlement label citizens prefer. It is which agreement can persuade them that it will be fair, safe and workable. It is worth reminding readers that our earlier research identified 118 specific variations of the Guterres Framework that could be accepted by at least 55% of voters in each of Cyprus's two communities. Details are available at https://cyprusconjointpredictions-knbomutrnxm22cyulm9bjq.streamlit.app/, where readers can assemble their own settlement package and test its acceptance against research data from a representative sample of voters in both communities.
Process: citizens want negotiations to resume, but not all in the same way
When a negotiating process remains stalled for years, it is easy to assume that society has lost interest. The absence of progress is interpreted as acceptance of the impasse, and fatigue as a wish to abandon the effort.
The results of the recent UCFS study, presented by the University of Cyprus's Bicommunal Relations Observatory, show something different. The large majority do not choose inaction. A total of 82.8% prefer some active route for continuing the peace effort, while only 17.2% choose not to resume negotiations.
The largest group, 38.7%, chooses to restart from the point at which the talks broke off at Crans-Montana. This preference reflects the view that there is no need to begin again from scratch. Convergences and a body of negotiating achievements already exist and can serve as the basis for a renewed effort.
This position has a practical logic. Any fresh start that disregards what has already been agreed risks reopening issues that took years to bring closer to resolution. At the same time, returning to Crans-Montana cannot mean simply reproducing the previous process. The reasons for its failure and the lack of trust must be addressed.
A second group, 21.9%, favours gradual implementation through an interim agreement: beginning to implement provisions of the settlement (for example, territorial return), followed by a referendum after three years. Rather than waiting for a comprehensive agreement that resolves every issue simultaneously, this approach emphasises agreed steps that could be implemented in sequence. Trust need not fully precede cooperation; it can be built through cooperation and help bridge the trust deficit surrounding implementation of the settlement.
Civic Assemblies are preferred by 22.2%. This is particularly significant because the institution has not yet become established in public debates about the Cyprus problem, even though the two leaders have already agreed to it. More than one in five prioritise a participatory process in which a representative body of randomly selected citizens, overseen by academics and civil-society representatives, would receive information, deliberate in a structured way, and formulate proposals or help resolve deadlocks. It is worth noting that when this idea is presented on its own, without comparison with other procedural options, it receives support from an overwhelming majority of the community - more than 80% according to our previous research. The recent debate during Guterres's visit to Cyprus over who represents civil society raises legitimate concerns; random selection can offer a fairer process of the kind already tested in many European countries as citizens' assemblies. In Cyprus in particular, where every institution except the universities receives a failing grade on trust, this process could revitalise confidence in institutions and deepen a culture of deliberative, rather than direct, democracy.
Citizens' Assemblies do not replace elected leaders or take over the negotiations. They can, however, fill a democratic gap. In traditional processes, society is often informed only at the end, once a plan has already been formed and citizens are asked to accept or reject it. With Citizens' Assemblies, by contrast, citizens become participants in decisions and share responsibility, making it easier for leaders to take difficult decisions.
The substantive finding is not only that resuming from Crans-Montana attracts the largest share. It is that society appears open to more than one active strategy. These approaches are not necessarily in competition: they can be combined in a process that draws on the negotiating achievements, gradually implements what can be agreed, and institutionalises citizen participation.
The dilemma, therefore, is not "negotiations or no negotiations". It is whether the next process will repeat the weaknesses of the past or combine continuity, credibility, implementation and social participation.
Intercommunal relations and contact: why opening more crossing points matters
Can two communities build a shared political future when most of their citizens rarely meet? The question touches on one of the least discussed dimensions of the Cyprus problem, despite the UN's justified insistence on opening additional crossing points and the central role of Gordon Allport's Contact Hypothesis (1954) in our research programme at the University of Cyprus. No agreement will be implemented in a social vacuum; human relationships are therefore of fundamental importance.
The Observatory's evidence first reveals a serious deficit in everyday contact. A total of 51.7% of Greek Cypriots say they have no contact at all with Turkish Cypriots. Another 32.4% have contact less than once a month. Only 15.9% report contact at least monthly, while just 8.3% have contact weekly or more often.
The absence of contact does not, however, amount to hostility. In addition to actual contact, the positive feelings of many Greek Cypriots towards Turkish Cypriots are supported by older people's accounts of the good quality of intercommunal relations before 1974. On a feeling thermometer ranging from 0 (negative or cold) to 100 (positive or warm), the average rating of Turkish Cypriots is 57.5. A total of 55.6% place themselves above the neutral point, 18.3% exactly at neutral, and 26.1% below it. The overall picture is therefore moderately positive.
Taken together, the two findings create an interesting paradox. Physical and social distance remain substantial, yet the emotional climate is not correspondingly negative. The experience of coexistence before 1974 provides social capital on which cooperation can be built. At the same time, when personal experience is limited, perceptions of the other community depend more heavily on the media, party narratives and current events, which rarely portray the other community positively and can undermine the effort towards reunification.
The study identifies a positive correlation between contact and emotional warmth, r = .33. This finding has been confirmed in more than 30 bicommunal studies conducted by our laboratory in Cyprus since 2007, supporting Gordon Allport's original contact hypothesis.
Many relevant published studies are available on the Observatory's main platform at https://cpsaltis-max.github.io/Bicommunal_Relations_Observatory/. The more frequent the contact, the warmer attitudes tend to be.
A similar pattern appears in acceptance of the BBF. Among those with no contact, 70.3% accept or tolerate the BBF. This rises to 80.3% among those with less-than-monthly contact, to 81.6% among those with at least monthly contact, and to 87.4% among those who meet Turkish Cypriots weekly or more often.
The findings show that the social and political dimensions of the Cyprus problem cannot be separated completely. Negotiations require institutions, but their sustainability also depends on whether citizens have opportunities for genuine cooperation.
Contact should not be treated merely as a symbol of bicommunalism. Repeated, equal-status cooperation oriented towards common goals matters more: in schools, universities, professional bodies, local communities and joint economic activities that deliver tangible everyday benefits to both communities.
The warning is that division is reproduced every day through the absence of relationships. The opportunity is that we are not starting from an environment of universal hostility. There is room for contact and gradual change, provided that we do not wait for a settlement before beginning to build its social foundations.
It is truly tragic that the Greek Cypriot side, which seeks to abolish geographical separation, has succumbed to a logic of "reciprocity" and securitisation over the opening of crossing points. This fails to recognise that their primary function is to enable contact between members of the two communities, build trust, and invest in citizens who can function in a reunited Cyprus free from fear-driven attitudes.
Beyond the overriding importance of opening crossing points, we should also remind readers that a bicommunal study conducted last year - funded by the LSE Hellenic Observatory and the organisations supporting ORA 7 (INCLUSIVEPEACE), as is the present study - identified three further confidence-building measures supported by majorities in both communities and capable of immediate implementation: (1) the already agreed photovoltaic park in the UN buffer zone, for use by both communities in Cyprus; (2) testimony before an investigative commission, tasked with documenting past human-rights violations in Cyprus, by individuals from both communities who personally harmed others; and (3) the preparation of new Cyprus history textbooks by a team of historians and educators from both communities. Agreement on these measures would demonstrate a genuine will for a settlement beyond any verbal formulations by the leaderships of the two communities.
From evidence to lessons: what does the study teach us about the future of the Cyprus problem and the Guterres approach?
When we began this presentation of the recent survey, we set out to examine the Guterres triptych: substance, process and confidence-building measures. What do Greek Cypriots really believe about the Cyprus problem today? We considered how the current impasse is evaluated, which settlements are acceptable, how familiar citizens are with the BBF and how they assess Crans-Montana, which hopes and fears predominate, how citizens understand the process, how much contact exists with Turkish Cypriots, and why that contact matters for opening additional crossing points.
What does all this mean for convening the next 5+1 meeting and for today's stalemate? During his recent visit, the UN Secretary-General referred to proper preparation on substance, process and confidence-building measures. The research evidence shows why this multidimensional preparation is necessary: society is deeply negative towards the status quo, but at the same time it is differentiated in its views of settlement models, its assessment of Crans-Montana, its expectations about implementation, and the level of everyday contact between the two communities.
The first conclusion is that Greek Cypriot society is not where we often imagine it to be - or perhaps where Turkey would like it to be. The study did not discover a society that has accepted partition. We did not find a society that rejects federation wholesale. We did not find an indifferent society. We found a society seeking credibility.
Citizens are not asking for perfect settlements. They are asking for solutions they believe can work. Trust should therefore not be treated only as a precondition for an agreement. It is also an outcome of how the agreement is designed. People have greater trust when they see that institutions have anticipated what will happen when difficulties arise.
The second conclusion is that the greatest fears concern not the idea of peace but its implementation: whether the state will function, whether deadlocks will arise, whether agreements will be honoured, and whether rights will be protected. The architecture of implementation is therefore just as important as the content of the settlement and the confidence-building measures (CBMs).
In earlier work, we have argued for institutional safeguards, the so-called backstops. Our full proposal is available at https://50shadesoffederalism.com/case-studies/unlocking-the-cyprus-peace-process-backstops-could-be-an-option/.
Backstops are needed not because the two communities are incapable of cooperation, but because every complex political system requires predictability about what happens when disagreements arise. The Observatory's findings reinforce the importance of this approach.
The third conclusion concerns the relationship between society and negotiations. Citizens do not wish to be informed only at the end, once everything has been decided. The substantial support for Civic Assemblies indicates that there is social space for a different democratic architecture in which society is not merely the final judge, but also a participant in dialogue.
The fourth conclusion concerns everyday life. Citizens connect the Cyprus problem with employment, mobility, property, costs and their children's opportunities. A new initiative must therefore consider not only constitutional architecture but also the practical consequences of a settlement in daily life.
Four pillars emerge: drawing on the negotiating convergences of Crans-Montana and facilitating their communication to the public; gradually implementing what can be agreed, above all by opening additional crossing points without preconditions of reciprocity; establishing institutional backstops for deadlocks; and securing meaningful citizen participation through deliberative institutions.
The Observatory of Bicommunal Relations https://cpsaltis-max.github.io/Bicommunal_Relations_Observatory/ was not created to replace negotiation. It was created to support it with better knowledge. Science does not decide and does not negotiate. It can, however, help ensure that public decisions rest more on evidence and less on assumptions. Perhaps this is the most important precondition for sustainable peace: that we continue to listen to society with scientific rigour before deciding its future.
