By Neophytos Loizides, University of Warwick
The Cyprus problem is returning to the agenda — this time with a different dynamic. According to UN sources, Cyprus is among the Secretary-General’s top two priorities before the end of his term later this year. The aim, according to the same sources, is to achieve meaningful progress, or at least a strategic framework agreement that could be handed over as a political legacy to his successor — with many diplomatic circles considering a woman from the Americas as the most likely candidate.
The timing is not accidental. On the Turkish Cypriot side, Turkish Cypriot leader Tufan Erhürman has repeatedly stressed the need for a tighter timetable and a clearer roadmap, rejecting a return to an open-ended process. A strategic framework agreement or a process with clearly defined milestones could, at least partly, respond to this demand.
Diplomatic momentum
At the same time, according to reliable diplomatic sources, signals from Ankara appear more positive than in previous periods, while the diplomatic window may be narrower than it seems. If momentum develops by the end of 2026, talks could gain substance before political attention shifts to elections in Greece and Turkey in 2027 — a period that traditionally limits political flexibility.
In other words, Cyprus may be entering a new moment of diplomatic momentum. Not necessarily a historic opportunity that guarantees success, but certainly a period of heightened expectations and diplomatic engagement that did not exist until recently.
Against this backdrop, President Nikos Christodoulides faces three strategic choices.
The first option is rupture — or, more precisely, a strategy of minimal cooperation. Under this scenario, the Greek Cypriot side participates formally in the process while avoiding meaningful initiatives, investing instead in the expectation that Turkey will either reject an agreement or ultimately bear responsibility for deadlock. The logic of this approach is politically understandable: minimising political cost, avoiding difficult compromises and preserving domestic political balances.
Yet the consequences of such a strategy could prove disastrous for the Cyprus problem. If the current momentum is lost, Cyprus risks entering another prolonged period of paralysis — potentially the first decade in recent memory without meaningful negotiations. At a time when partition is deepening on the ground, facts on the ground are consolidating and international attention is shifting elsewhere, the cost of deadlock is neither neutral nor reversible.
Geopolitical chessboard
Cyprus’s political history also offers a warning: strategies of rejection or limited engagement are rarely rewarded politically in the long term. The rejection of the Cuéllar draft framework agreement in the 1980s — viewed by many international actors as a missed opportunity — was followed by the eventual loss of power by Spyros Kyprianou. Similarly, the rejection of the Annan Plan in 2004, despite its short-term political dividends, did not translate into long-term political survival for Tassos Papadopoulos, who failed to secure re-election in 2008.
The second option is chess — or perhaps more accurately, strategic cooperation in the expectation that Turkey will ultimately not deliver. This option may also align most closely with how many admirers of Nikos Christodoulides see him: as a skilled diplomat capable of navigating difficult geopolitical chessboards with patience, alliances and careful timing.
In this scenario, the Greek Cypriot side actively participates in negotiations, accepts confidence-building measures, presents itself internationally as constructive and invests political capital in a process it may privately believe is unlikely to succeed. The political calculation is straightforward: if Turkey ultimately says “no” — or insists on terms that make agreement impossible — the Greek Cypriot side emerges diplomatically strengthened, having demonstrated good faith.
There are reasons why this strategy may appear politically attractive. The Blue Homeland legislation, increasing emphasis on harder geopolitical positions in the Eastern Mediterranean, the prosecution and imprisonment of opposition mayors and broader democratic backsliding raise legitimate doubts over Ankara’s willingness to bear the political cost of a meaningful Cyprus settlement.
Another factor is the weakening of more moderate voices within Turkish politics. In the Republican People’s Party (CHP), leadership figures who in recent years had cultivated closer ties with Erhürman’s CTP and supported more pragmatic, federalist approaches to Cyprus have increasingly come under political pressure and judicial scrutiny, weakening a potentially alternative voice in Turkish politics.
Game of poker
Yet chess also carries risks — chiefly because Turkey has often proved the better player. From 1974 to the Crans-Montana talks, Ankara has repeatedly managed to turn complex negotiations into strategic advantage, often exploiting Greek Cypriot divisions or miscalculations. Anyone playing chess — or perhaps poker — in the expectation that the other side is bluffing must be certain they are not bluffing themselves.
The third option settlement involves a strategy of genuine investment in Cyprus negotiations, not simply managing the process. In this scenario, Christodoulides cooperates not because he expects the other side to fail, but because he believes there is at least a limited window of opportunity worth exhausting.
This is also the most demanding option. A serious settlement effort requires political capital, preparation of public opinion and — above all — collective political ownership. If the President pursues meaningful negotiations, responsibility cannot rest solely on him. The broader political system, from centrist parties to moderate voices on the left and right, would need to assume part of the responsibility — potentially even through forms of coalition governance. The political dynamics that appear to be emerging between DISY and DIKO ahead of 2028 create a new layer of uncertainty for the President himself. It is entirely plausible that the leaderships of the two parties may ultimately choose one of their own party candidates, put themselves forward, or even agree on a third consensus figure. In other words, Nikos Christodoulides’ re-election may become particularly difficult unless there are specific reasons that render him politically indispensable.
The approach
One possible approach would be a mixed methodology summit. The first step would involve clarifying the convergences reached at Crans-Montana and previous rounds: do the two sides genuinely share an understanding of what was agreed, or have interpretations diverged to such an extent that simply “returning where we left off” is no longer realistic?
A second step would involve a serious discussion on implementation guarantees and the consequences of non-compliance. Turkish Cypriots often fear another unilateral Greek Cypriot rejection without cost, while many Greek Cypriots fear that Turkey may fail to fully implement any agreement. The crucial question is whether mechanisms could now be designed to bind both sides — or whether even this approach remains politically and practically difficult to implement.
A third — and perhaps more realistic — approach may lie in the logic of guaranteed benefits (backstops): agreed safeguards automatically activated in the event of deadlock. Examples might include phased implementation with mutual benefits from the outset, automatic activation of agreed steps and political or diplomatic costs for whichever side deviates. According to diplomatic sources, a more flexible and multi-layered process — combining leadership negotiations, citizen participation and implementation safeguards — may today represent the most realistic path forward. In this context, the Greek Cypriot proposal for civic assemblies appears to have made a positive impression within UN circles, offering a participatory mechanism for trust-building and addressing difficult issues beyond traditional elite negotiations.
