Tufan Erhürman is the sixth Turkish Cypriot leader since the island’s division tasked with resolving the conflict. With 63% of the vote in the first round, he’s been given a strong mandate to see through on his pledge to claw back some autonomy for Turkish Cypriots after years of increasing interventions in domestic affairs by Ankara, and bring about a federal solution.
His predecessor Ersin Tatar campaigned adamantly for a two-state solution with Ankara’s blessing, and tried to shut down avenues of reconciliation, such as the highly successful educational programme ‘Imagine’ for school children on both sides of the divide.
In President Nikos Christodoulides, Tatar found an interlocutor more engaged in developing and deepening relations with other, more powerful countries than in breaking the deadlock on the island. Despite meeting three times in an expanded format with the guarantor powers under UN auspices (once in 2021 and twice this year), Tatar and Christodoulides never achieved more than a few low-level measures, supposedly designed to build confidence, but never living up to the task.
Now, Erhürman enters the stage, ready to engage with Ankara and Christodoulides. He campaigned in favour of a federation, but left room for manoeuvre on the finer details. He also sent a clear message to the Greek Cypriots that if talks resume, there will be no return to the status quo. If the conditions for talks are not met, he said the two sides should start negotiating on other matters such as “crossing points, the Green Line Regulation, direct trade, and EU citizenship rights for children born of mixed marriages”.
Time for a sincerity test
Politis to the point spoke with people close to Erhürman to explore his options as he seeks to develop relations with both Ankara and the Greek Cypriots.
PRIO Cyprus Centre researcher Mete Hatay, who openly campaigned for Erhürman on social media, suggested an incremental approach to building trust after years of mistrust.
“This is a comfortable conflict, which in some ways, both sides have been benefiting from. To expose that, both sides should enter a sincerity test, adopting confidence-building measures – both reciprocal and unilateral,” said Hatay.
The first step will probably be an agreement to open two new checkpoints – Mia Milia and Athienou – in the 5+1 meeting with the guarantors by the end of the year.
The next stage will be harder. The Republic of Cyprus holds the EU Presidency for the first six months of 2026, and has parliamentary elections scheduled for next May, with far-right ELAM polling third at present. Elections will likely take place in the north too, given the evident unpopularity of the current ruling coalition.
The researcher encouraged Erhürman to make big gestures through unilateral actions. He specified two areas for action.
Open up Varosha under joint control
The first would be to revisit the Varosha issue and put it on a more productive framework rather than creating a museum of pain. Give people back their properties in Varosha and set up a third type of administration there, that could technically be under UN control, but have bicommunal elements.
“Varosha is not just a bargaining chip for Turkish Cypriots. It’s a burden, in terms of value. There are no people living there so giving it back to original owners will not affect any current users or require further displacement. Meanwhile, it is costing more and more, as the potential value of compensation for ‘loss of use’ is piling up. We are talking about a huge amount.”
Hatay argued that Varosha is a relatively small area with huge value.
“The whole of Varosha should be opened for restitution of properties. That would allow around 30,000 refugees to return. The territory can be put under joint control of the two sides. But Christodoulides would also have to show goodwill.”
Hatay’s proposal includes the opening of ports and airports. Ercan airport in Tymbou could be set up with two terminals, one under UN or EU control for international flights, and the other terminal just for flights to and from Turkey, he suggested. The same approach could be taken for Famagusta port, with one section of the port under EU/UN control and another under Turkish Cypriot control.
By partially opening the airports and ports in the north to international traffic, Turkey could implement the Ankara Protocol, allowing flights from Larnaca to Istanbul for example, while opening up its ports to Cypriot-flagged ships, counting for the third largest fleet in the EU.
“This would lower tensions, and remove confrontation, while allowing Turkish Cypriots to engage in more sustainable economic activity, rather than focusing on casino tourism and the grey economy,” he said.
Return of Maronites
Hatay’s second proposal is for Erhürman to reintroduce the Maronite restitution plan that was endorsed by Turkey, and launched by Akıncı after Crans-Montana, but which ended up in the freezer.
“The current US Ambassador to Turkey is a Maronite. You can use these influences to resume that project, without having to agree with the Greek Cypriots.”
Hatay explained that the Maronite properties – counting for 80,000 donums of mostly agricultural land – became militarised areas, mainly used for accommodation.
He argued that around 6,000 Maronites could have their property returned, and be offered political rights too.
Change of mindset
Hatay called for a change of mindset among the Greek Cypriot leadership. Erhürman’s election was an important step that showed Turkish Cypriots rejected Turkish interference in their affairs.
“This needs to be met by Christodoulides with important steps. Greek Cypriots can’t just say Erhürman is another Turkish pawn. Of course, Turkey is the influential side in this problem, but Turkish Cypriots have agency and have shown it many times, even though they are in this awkward situation between two sides.”
Hatay argued that instead of bemoaning Turkey’s dominance in the north and attempting to ‘criminalise’ everything Turkish Cypriots do, Greek Cypriots could take steps to engage with them, without this meaning recognition. Give citizenships to children of mixed marriages. Facilitate increased trade. Let universities participate in the EU’s Bologna Process, creating a level of accountability in tertiary education, he added.
‘CBMs a waste of time’
In contrast, former Turkish Cypriot negotiator Ozdil Nami believes CBMs are a waste of time, having “delivered nothing in the past 20 years” mainly due to the ‘recognition’ obstacle. He argued that Turkish Cypriots are fed up of living in isolation. Both the left and the right-wing voted for Erhürman because he vowed to end the status quo.
“Turkish Cypriots want to end the status of being in limbo, detached from international law and the international community. They want to become a normal country with accountability and the rest of it,” he said.
Nami believes that Erhürman and Ankara will reach an understanding on the way forward, noting that Ankara has always been very pragmatic on these issues.
“Turkey shifted to a two-state policy because after pushing for a federal solution in 2004 and 2017, in both cases it was let down by the Greek Cypriot leadership. This showed the Greek Cypriots were not sincere about a federal settlement.”
He argued that if Ankara sees the possibility of a credible solution process through Erhürman’s approach that will end the Cyprus problem one way or another, then there is a high probability they will engage.
Four conditions including a big one
Nami is widely considered to be the architect behind Erhürman’s positions on the peace talks, making his opinion worth listening to.
In the campaign, Erhürman set out a number of conditions for the resumption of talks. Nami elaborated on these positions for Politis.
First, he stressed that political equality was not up for negotiation. “It is a UN parameter that should not be part of the give-and-take process anymore. It was largely resolved in the lead up to Crans-Montana.”
Rotating presidency is considered a given, with the only remaining issue being the ‘positive vote’ that can be easily resolved, argued Nami. The two leaders are not expected to agree on every detail of political equality before resuming talks, but the principle should be underlined, he added.
Second, a timetable should be set for negotiations that would result in referenda on a freely negotiated settlement. Nami noted that if the sides agree to start where they left off, then one to three months, at most six, would be more than enough to complete negotiations.
Third, past convergences must be protected. Nami said his understanding of past convergences includes all the ‘common documents’ deposited with the UN, as well as the six-point Guterres Framework.
He noted that all sides had given their consent to the framework. Guterres had provided a main outline on six issues, and asked the sides to engage in a give-and-take, while indicating how those issues should be resolved. First priority should be given to resolving the differences on the Guterres Framework, said Nami.
On the fourth and most contentious position, no return to the status quo, Nami argued this was a “no brainer”, noting that the status quo was the “comfort zone” of the Greek Cypriots.
“If once again I vote in favour of a federal settlement and once again the Greek Cypriot side rejects something freely negotiated, this would mean that they are no longer interested in a federal settlement, and I should be accorded equal status to them. Why should I continue to be punished for the non-solution. This is the essence of the matter.”
According to Nami, there was no justification for keeping one side hostage while the other enjoys the benefits of a state. Greek Cypriots must take a concrete decision on marriage or divorce with Turkish Cypriots, and this can be reflected in the wording of the referendum question, he added.
These conditions are a face-saving formula that will allow Ankara – which does not believe Greek Cypriots are willing to accept political equality – to give a federal formula one last chance, noted Nami.
Process not content
The priority now is not to prepare the climate. “The climate will never be ready. CBMs will be needed even after a settlement.” The top priority is to design a proper negotiation process, focusing not on content, but on fixing the process, argued Nami.
Asked whether Ankara would show the necessary flexibility on guarantees – the main issue in the Guterres Framework – Nami argued that Turkey already did so by agreeing to the UN chief’s position that intervention rights cannot continue and that a new system must be created. Whether they would do it again depends on whether they will see light at the end of the tunnel, he suggested.
Asked to clarify what measure exactly should be taken if Greek Cypriots rejected a negotiated solution again, Nami said he could not speak on Erhürman’s behalf. While some speculate that Erhürman might ask for recognition of the north, others suggest that he would seek a guarantee of direct trade and flights if peace talks collapsed.
Time to talk about talks
Asked to comment on the likelihood of talks resuming, director of Sapienta Economics Fiona Mullen told Politis: “There are scholars thinking about how you can build some sort of reassurance mechanism into the process so that both sides feel incentivised as opposed to threatened.”
She added: “When Turkish Cypriots say there need to be consequences for another failure, the Greek Cypriots hear ‘recognition of the TRNC’. And until that part of the proposal is fleshed out, other people are going to fill in the vacuum.”
Mullen agreed with the need to engage in talks about the negotiations process itself, and to move away from the idea of disincentives towards incentives to get the sides to the table and keep the talks going.
“It needs a lot of careful structuring,” she said.