The Cyprus peace talks have seen the longest stalemate in their history, with no formal negotiations underway since 2017. The arrival of a federalist Turkish Cypriot leader has once again brought hope of change. But how realistic is it to expect a breakthrough? The sides have tried and failed time and time again, adopting the same method and under the same process. The question now, however, is not so much whether the talks will succeed, but how they will even start.
Tufan Erhürman has said he wants time-limited, results-oriented talks that will not allow a return to the status quo if they fail, raising the question of preconditions. His close adviser Ozdil Nami told Politis to the point that if Turkish Cypriots engage in talks for a federal solution one last time, they need to know they will no longer be held hostage, should the Greek Cypriots reject a solution.
It remains to be seen what, if any, conditions Erhürman will actually set for the resumption of negotiations, and how President Nikos Christodoulides might respond. Should they fail to find a way forward, the two leaders could soon find themselves stuck in interminable discussions on confidence-building measures (CBMs), as witnessed under Ersin Tatar’s leadership.
The concern now is whether the leaders will find a way to return to the table, and if so, how they will engage in the process to ensure – against all odds – a successful outcome.
A new approach
This is where four academics have come in with new ideas on how to avoid predictable pitfalls and finally take the process over the finish line, with the support of both communities. Neophytos Loizides, Meltem Onurkan-Samani, Erol Kaymak and Charis Psaltis co-penned an article for the ’50 Shades of Federalism’ project, suggesting that a future process could include ‘backstops’ as a way to ensure certain positive results regardless of the outcome of negotiations. They define ‘backstop’ as a form of safeguard or contingency plan that will kick in if parties fail to reach a comprehensive settlement.
The four note that backstops can have positive effects on prolonged stalemates like in Cyprus, and have gained prominence in UN and international mediations, from Northern Ireland and Ukraine to Syria. They can be used in process design to facilitate negotiations and encourage a positive outcome, but also as a post-solution mechanism to ensure implementation.
Negotiation backstops
While negotiations in Cyprus have always been based on the ‘big bang’ principle that ‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’, they advocate to flip that principle on its head. Implement certain elements of progress during the process and let that incentivise the sides towards a final, comprehensive agreement.
“We encourage the UN and all sides to think in terms of backstop mechanisms across a wide range of issues (e.g. security, implementation, human rights and demographic) and to introduce explicitly a backstop terminology in a revived process,” they said.
The four Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot academics cite successful international precedents, such as the more recent ‘Irish backstop’ negotiated at the start of the Brexit talks. Known as the Northern Ireland Protocol, this backstop essentially ruled out the possibilty of a hard border being unilaterally imposed between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. This, in turn, allowed British and EU/Irish negotiators to begin talks without the threat of major upheaval on the island of Ireland hanging over them.
Less known is Cyprus’ own ‘mini-backstop’ agreed during the Brexit talks that produced a safeguard against creating a hard border between the British Bases and the Republic of Cyprus. This avoided putting 11,000 residents of the Bases in legal limbo and disrupting the movement of people, goods and services during the long, lively days of Brexit negotiations.
The only time in the history of the Cyprus peace talks that a backstop mechanism was introduced was in the 1978 Anglo-American Canadian plan, which included the return of Varosha to coincide with the resumption of talks, regardless of their outcome. Alas, talks never started.
Five proposals
The academics list five alternative backstop proposals on Cyprus currently under discussion in various quarters.
- Former political figures from across the divide issued a joint declaration in 2024, facilitated by Meltem Onurkan-Samani, recommending that future referendums should not include the continuation of the status quo among possible outcomes.
- Ozdil Nami has proposed a “clear timetable” for talks, at the end of which, in a referendum, “Turkish Cypriots could be given the choice between federation and isolation, and Greek Cypriots could be given the choice between federation and a two-state solution.”
- Erol Kaymak suggests predetermined backstops should be structured around verifiable milestones within the talks to incentivise gradual commitments. If one side is found to be obstructing progress, however, consequences will come into effect as an alternative to a comprehensive agreement.
- Internationally renowned commercial arbitration lawyer Constantine Partasides KC proposes to use international arbitration that will involve ‘backstop’ changes to the status quo if talks fail. A neutral arbitral tribunal (e.g. led by a senior diplomat of a neutral country) can be charged with determining responsibility for the breakdown, with the consequence that the other side’s backstop position is adopted (e.g. Varosha for the Greek Cypriots and limited attributes of autonomy for the Turkish Cypriots).
- Neophytos Loizides focuses on securing significant early wins for all sides at the start of the talks. Similar to the Partasides proposal, an ad hoc tribunal (e.g. led by a senior diplomat of a neutral country) could guarantee both the return of Varosha and limited international autonomy for TCs. This way both sides will start the talks with a ‘significant win’ consistent in the case of Varosha with the High-Level agreements and previous proposals for CBMs. If parties fail to agree on the details, the ad hoc tribunal will decide how Varosha and autonomy will be regulated, for instance, on the basis of the goodwill each side demonstrates in the comprehensive talks, thus acting as an incentive to reach an overall agreement.
Implementation backstops
One fear that keeps popping up in the Greek Cypriot community is the question of whether Turkey will implement the terms of a settlement. The four academics argue that backstops are not just for the negotiation process, they are also useful in encouraging implementation on a range of issues.
For example, property owners and users could be guaranteed a minimum compensation in advance (proportional to their pre-1974 properties) if they are negatively affected by the negotiated criteria on property. Research shows such a backstop would contribute to double majorities on both sides of the divide in a referendum, the article points out.
On the main issue that appeared to crash the Crans-Montana talks, the academics argue that a ‘security and implementation backstop’ could transform a high-risk game into a mutually-enforcing cooperative interaction.
For example, a security backstop could determine the final number of foreign troops remaining on the island, considering factors such as the degree to which each side has met its pre-agreed commitments. This has the potential to take out the sting from the ‘sunset clause’ over ‘review of troops’ debate. It links final decisions to good behaviour. The party that implements the solution agreement best will have its security preferences prioritised by an arbitration tribunal while the party that fails to do so will have its legal entitlements reduced.
The four academics point to academic research showing that, as in the case of Northern Ireland, such security backstops will effectively contribute to winning double majorities in a future twin referendum in Cyprus.
When you have a risky agreement that plays with the worst fears of each side, backstop mechanisms can provide insurances against those fears of non-implementation, and “transform even the most sceptical of minds in difficult or high risk negotiations”.
“Backstop is the new promising term in conflict resolution. Backstops carry promise and potential across international negotiations and in Cyprus they appear to be an essential next step in moving forwards,” they conclude.
Professor Loizides on ‘adoptability’ issue
Politis to the point spoke with one of the academics involved, Warwick University Professor of International Conflict Analysis Neophytos Loizides, to learn more about backstops and the potential options facing Cyprus.
He noted that Nami’s proposal to ensure an end to the status quo by posing specific questions to each community in a referendum is facing resistance, even among moderates.
“It has an adoptability issue. Turkeys don’t vote for Christmas. Greek Cypriots won’t accept it.”
There is also the question of who to blame if negotiations fail and how you measure that; based on what criteria, ethical or legal, and who decides, noted Loizides.
In his election campaign, Erhürman watered down Nami’s proposal, saying he wanted a federation, but that if the Greek Cypriots reject it, there should be consequences. In this way, he won over the pro-federalists but also those sceptical of Greek Cypriot intentions such as Serdar Denktash and others, noted Loizides.
However, the formula that won him the elections is not implementable. A lot of work has been done by the academic community to move away from this sense of punishment and consequences and towards backstops and win-win scenarios.
A way out of the quagmire
“The most successful negotiations in the world have used backstops,” he said, including the Prespa agreement between Greece and North Macedonia, brokered by Matthew Nimetz.
On Cyprus, he argued, just one example of a win-win formula could be to open Varosha, as agreed in the 1979 High-Level Agreement, while lifting the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots through direct flights and direct trade. The parameters of the backstops could be agreed by the sides based on what they would each like to see happen, should the talks fail, for example, in six months time. Who would carry out the arbitration, under what conditions and in what areas would all be agreed in advance, said Loizides.
“The advantage of arbitration comes with its finality. You know, for example, that if all else fails, in six months time, you will get Varosha.”
Arbitration ensures a neutral approach, where the conditions on how the backstop will be enacted will depend on each side’s effective commitment to the negotiation process. If for example, an arbitration tribunal finds that the Greek Cypriots were the least committed to the talks process, then Varosha might be returned under a power-sharing system instead. Issues such as who pays for the reconstruction, what laws will apply, what area is covered, will all be decided accordingly by arbitration, for example. Rather than letting the sides negotiate indefinitely over the smallest details of each backstop, turning them into “confidence-destroying measures”, the details are left to be decided by a neutral body.
Backstop measures have the potential to create excitement about the future. Even if the talks fail, Varosha is returned, for example, and this creates momentum as people return, the town is regenerated, and trade increases between the two sides, all producing new motivation for a comprehensive settlement, said Loizides.
The academic argued that facilitation with limited elements of arbitration is the most logical method for Cyprus, and a much better option than mediation where the weaker party is at the mercy of the mediator, who could be someone as unpredictable as Donald Trump.
If 95% of the solution was agreed in Crans-Montana, why would you give all that up for the remaining 5%, the academic asked. Why not narrow down the remaining issues that are not existential, and leave them for a future arbitration tribunal to decide on when all sides are in a better positition to tackle them? The sides will need to decide in advance on the timing of the arbitration and who will be responsible.
“So, we solve the Cyprus problem, go to referenda, and leave 5-6 issues for future arbitration. The party that best enforces a future settlement will get their ideas prioritised in that process.
“You turn a problem (the 5% remaining issues) into an asset. If either side does not implement what has already been agreed within the 95%, they risk losing legal entitlements in future arbitration decisions.”
Loizides stressed that no big corporation will sign any contract nowadays without backstops, referring to commercial arbitration. “You need to create some kind of enforcement mechanisms into a settlement,” he added.
'Annan was not arbitration'
Loizides was at pains to stress that what occurred during the Annan Plan negotiations was not arbitration but assisted mediation.
“Arbitration is associated with finality. You agree on parameters, who will do the arbitration, what will happen, when it will happen, and the outcome is final. The final outcome will lead to a settlement of the dispute and good relations between the parties involved who accept those parameters. You don’t decide afterwards that you don’t like the decision.”
“If there is no finality, what you have is assisted mediation,” he argued.
In Cyprus, the referendum came after mediation, not before. For example, in the territorial dispute between Belise and Guatamala, there was a referendum first on how to handle the dispute, the results of which allowed the parties to take the issue to the International Court of Justice for a final decision.
Loizides concluded that he did not think a complex solution like that being considered for Cyprus could happen without some form of arbitration or deadlock-breaking mechanisms, even on small issues. Otherwise, every ambiguity can turn into a potential spoiler.
In order not to lose the current momentum, the political elite needs to urgently rethink its obsession against arbitration, he argued.