When CHP leader Özgür Özel recently said that “a democratic Türkiye will once again be a wanted country in the West,” he did more than speak to his party’s base. He reignited one of the most enduring and uneasy questions in Turkish foreign policy:
Can returning to a democratic path really change the way Europe sees Türkiye? Or is the problem not political, but existential, that the European Union simply does not see room for a Muslim-majority democracy within its cultural architecture?
And beyond that, a deeper, more strategic question arises: If Europe continues to treat Türkiye as a security partner but not a family member, what are Türkiye’s real alternatives? Can Ankara afford to look elsewhere, to Moscow, Beijing, or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, without compromising its Western anchors?
A comfortable contradiction
The European Union has quietly settled into a position that suits it well: Türkiye as a strategic ally outside the Union, close enough to help, far enough not to complicate.
For Brussels, this is the best of both worlds, a Türkiye that guards its borders, manages migration, mediates in regional conflicts, and provides crucial energy corridors, all while remaining outside the political and legal entanglements of membership.
Since 2018, Türkiye’s accession process has been effectively frozen. Each new European Commission report repeats the same refrain: “no progress on the judiciary,” “backsliding on fundamental rights,” “partial alignment with the Common Foreign and Security Policy.”
Meanwhile, the same reports celebrate Ukraine, Moldova, and the Western Balkans for their “European aspirations.”
It is an open secret in Brussels that the current formula, yes to security, no to family, is too convenient to change. Türkiye is simply too large, too Muslim, and too politically complex to fit easily into the EU’s institutional framework.
And yet, paradoxically, the more the EU excludes Türkiye politically, the more it depends on it strategically.
Would reform really bring change ?
If a future CHP government were to bring Türkiye back to the rule of law standards of the early 2000s, there is no doubt Brussels would notice. Tone matters in diplomacy, and a credible democratic shift would soften language, reopen dialogue, and perhaps even revive optimism in European capitals.
But would it reopen accession chapters? Unlikely.
The obstacles are not only normative but structural:
• Cyprus veto politics remain the single most immediate barrier to any procedural progress.
• Populist domestic pressures in Austria, France, and the Netherlands make Turkish membership politically toxic.
• Institutional fatigue inside the EU, already stretched with Ukraine and Moldova, leaves little bandwidth for another complex candidate.
So yes, reforms would change the climate, but not the topography. They would warm the atmosphere, but the mountains would still stand where they always have.
Cultural hesitations or political excuses?
Europe’s hesitation is not only political, it is also cultural. The EU insists religion plays no role in its decisions, yet the fact remains: it has no Muslim-majority member. Bosnia and Albania, both small and relatively compliant, remain stalled.
The question, then, is not just whether Türkiye meets the Copenhagen criteria, but whether Europe itself meets the Ankara reality: a secular but Muslim-majority democracy, modern yet nonconformist, and capable of shaping, not merely following, Western policy.
Would Brussels truly welcome a Türkiye of 85 million citizens with voting power equal to Germany or France?
Would European publics accept such a demographic and cultural shift within the Union’s decision-making structure?
The silence in European corridors answers louder than any press statement: For many, the “European family” is not ready for a Türkiye that would change its character, only for a Türkiye that guards its borders.
The Eastern temptation?
If Europe’s door remains half closed, can Türkiye find a different path? Could Ankara “look East,” to Russia, China, or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, for strategic depth?
Türkiye’s observer status in the SCO gives it symbolic leverage. It signals to Brussels and Washington that Ankara has other tables to sit at.
The SCO offers political visibility and cooperation on counterterrorism and connectivity projects. Yet, structurally, it is not a substitute for the EU or NATO. It lacks the legal, financial, and institutional weight of Western frameworks.
Its members, China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Iran, often have conflicting agendas, and their security doctrines are far from aligned. The SCO may offer networking opportunities, but not the rule based predictability that Türkiye’s export driven economy depends on.
The Russia connection
Türkiye’s pragmatic engagement with Moscow, from energy (TurkStream, Akkuyu) to grain diplomacy, demonstrates the value of flexible alignment.
But Russia is both a partner and a problem: a power in decline, sanctioned, and geopolitically toxic for Western investors. Leaning too far toward Moscow risks secondary sanctions, financial isolation, and erosion of Türkiye’s credibility within NATO.
The China track
China presents both opportunity and caution. Its financing and infrastructure projects could accelerate Türkiye’s logistics and industrial base, linking Anatolia to the Belt and Road network.
However, deeper dependence on Chinese capital comes with strategic strings, surveillance technologies, data governance issues, and compatibility problems with NATO standards.
A warmer relationship with Beijing may expand Türkiye’s room for maneuver, but it cannot replace the access, standards, and capital depth of the European market.
Can Türkiye leave NATO?
The short answer is no, not without immense cost. NATO remains Türkiye’s ultimate security guarantee. Its deterrence umbrella, defense technology ecosystem, and intelligence networks cannot be replicated elsewhere.
Leaving NATO would not only isolate Türkiye militarily but also shatter investor confidence, trigger capital flight, and sharply raise the country’s risk premium.
Türkiye’s best strategy is not to abandon NATO but to reshape its role within it, to build strategic autonomy without strategic divorce. This means developing domestic defense capacity (as it is doing with KAAN, drones, and smart munitions) while retaining interoperability and influence within the Alliance.
In other words, Türkiye’s future lies not in leaving the West, but in redefining how it engages it.
West, security and family policy
Not forever, because the contradictions are growing.
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Dependence deepens. Each new crisis, migration, Gaza, Syria, Ukraine, energy, reinforces Europe’s reliance on Türkiye’s geography and diplomacy. The EU cannot indefinitely expect Turkish cooperation on security while denying it political equality.
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Credibility erodes. The EU’s claim to be a community of values weakens every time it rewards autocracies with trade and punishes Türkiye with distance. Europe’s moral authority cannot survive its own double standards indefinitely.
Sooner or later, the EU will have to decide whether Türkiye is a partner it can outsource its border control to, or a political equal it must finally face at the table.
A realistic strategy
The path forward is neither full rupture nor blind patience. Türkiye’s power lies in mastering the balance of leverage, East and West, value and interest, principle and pragmatism.
1.Reform for Türkiye, not for Brussels. Strengthening rule of law, transparency, and free media is not a favor to Europe, it is an investment in Türkiye’s own resilience, economy, and dignity.
2. Bankable deliverables, not abstract promises.
• Micro modernization of the Customs Union.
• Multi entry visa facilitation for defined categories.
• Green transition alignment to preserve market access.
• Cooperation in science, energy, and civil protection.
3. Smart diversification, not decoupling. Engage China for logistics and investment but protect data sovereignty. Keep dialogue with Russia on energy and Syria but avoid secondary sanctions. Use SCO and Turkic frameworks for visibility, not dependency.
4. Crisis management with Greece and Cyprus. Reduce friction, reopen dialogue, and prevent local disputes from defining Türkiye’s broader strategy.
Final questions for Europe and for Türkiye
• If democracy returns, will Brussels truly open its doors, or simply applaud politely while maintaining the status quo?
• Can Europe reconcile its Christian heritage narrative with a modern, Muslim-majority democracy that insists on equality?
• Can Türkiye afford to challenge the West while depending on Western finance, markets, and technology?
• And perhaps most critically: how long can both sides live with a partnership that is indispensable yet incomplete?
Beyond either or
Türkiye’s choice is not between East and West, but between dependence and sovereign pluralism. It cannot afford the fantasy of a clean break from NATO or the illusion of unconditional EU membership.
The real future lies in simultaneity, a Türkiye that remains within NATO, deepens trade and regulatory integration with the EU, while diversifying its global partnerships smartly and selectively.
Neither “yes to everything Western” nor “no to everything Western,” but rather a Türkiye that decides what partnership truly means on its own terms.
Because in the end, the most important question is not whether Europe wants Türkiye back, but whether Türkiye still wants the same Europe it once aspired to join.