By Valia Kaimaki
Almost one month after the elections that ended Viktor Orbán’s 16-year dominance, Hungary appears to be returning to Europe’s embrace. The image is enticing. A new prime minister, Péter Magyar, is preparing to take office, Brussels appears relieved, frozen European funds are back on the table and Budapest is even talking about joining the euro by 2030.
The reality, however, is far more difficult than the political snapshot of change suggests. Orbán lost the government, but his system did not disappear. It remains embedded in institutions, the media, economic networks, the public administration and in a large segment of society that did not suddenly shift towards liberal Europeanism.
The first major test of the new era is very specific. Hungary is seeking €10.4 billion from the European Recovery and Resilience Facility, funds that were frozen due to rule-of-law violations under Orbán. Of this amount, €6.5 billion are grants and €3.9 billion are loans.
The new government wants the full sum. The European Commission, however, is pressing for Hungary to receive only the grants, because time is extremely limited, the reform conditions are numerous and the Hungarian economy has little room to absorb new burdens. Public debt stands at around 75 per cent of GDP, while the deficit is forecast to approach 7 per cent in 2026.
The real problem
This is where Magyar’s real problem begins. For Brussels, a change of government is good news, but it is not enough. The funds were not frozen out of antipathy towards Orbán. They were frozen because Hungary had drifted away from the European Union’s institutional guarantees.
The new prime minister is therefore not simply asked to change tone. He is asked to prove that he is changing the rules.
For him, however, the political cost is obvious. If he returns to Budapest with less money than he promised to unlock, Orbán will have a ready-made narrative of failure. If, on the other hand, he appears to accept Brussels’ demands uncritically, he will be accused of allowing the EU to govern the country.
At the same time, within Hungary itself, the old system is showing its first signs of panic. The image of a businessman who enriched himself through state communication contracts during the Orbán era, appearing on camera in tears and offering part of his companies to the state, is almost emblematic.
This is not simply a personal story. It is the symptom of a mechanism that learned to live off public contracts, government propaganda and campaigns against political opponents, European institutions and international leaders. Now, as investigations into possible embezzlement and money laundering open and accounts are frozen, figures from the old regime are trying to save whatever they can.
The dismantling of Orbánism is not an abstract exercise in democratic restoration. It is a confrontation with interests, assets, contracts and networks of power.
The institutional dimension of this confrontation was also evident in the Constitutional Court’s decision to annul key provisions of the decree on the so-called solidarity tax imposed on wealthier municipalities. The decree was issued using the emergency powers acquired by the Orbán government after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and effectively sought to block legal challenges to the measure.
For its critics, it was not simply a redistributive policy in favour of poorer regions, but a means of financially strangling municipalities not controlled by the government, primarily Budapest. The partial annulment of the decree shows that certain institutional checks are beginning to reassert themselves.
This does not mean, however, that the centralised architecture of the Orbán era has been dismantled overnight.
The euro
Against this backdrop, the promise of joining the euro by 2030 functions more as a political signal than as a certain economic objective. Magyar wants to show that Hungary is returning to the European core, away from the “illiberal” periphery to which Orbán had led it.
The euro would mean stability, lower borrowing costs, reduced exchange-rate risk and a stronger European orientation. It would also require tough fiscal adjustment, deficit reduction, inflation control and discipline in an economy that is already under strain. A government newly elected on high expectations will have to explain that European normality comes at a cost.
There is also a deeper contradiction. Magyar’s victory was a vote for change, but not necessarily a vote for a full geopolitical shift. His voters appear far more open to ambitious climate policy and the protection of LGBTI rights than he himself suggested during the election campaign.
Yet Hungarian society remains divided on issues such as Ukraine and dependence on Russian energy. Many want better relations with the European Union, but do not necessarily want to see their country at the forefront of support for Kyiv or to sever energy ties with Moscow abruptly.
This is why Magyar cannot simply be read as anti-Orbán on all fronts. His recent meeting with Giorgia Meloni indicates that he wants to position himself as a pro-European conservative, not as a progressive reformer in the classic sense.
He speaks of defence, competitiveness and a tough stance on irregular migration. Hungary appears to be moving away from Orbán’s anti-European trajectory without abandoning its right-wing agenda.
The country has indeed turned a page. It has not yet changed its narrative. Orbán has left the premiership, but not the political landscape.
Magyar faces a rare opportunity and an almost impossible balancing act. To restore Brussels’ trust without appearing subservient to it. To pursue corruption without unleashing an uncontrolled war with half the state. To promise European normality without concealing its economic cost.
Post-Orbán Hungary will not be judged by the victory of April, but by whether it can dismantle the old regime without destabilising itself.
