In the past, the Cyprus problem stood at the centre of political life, primarily as the major national issue. Today, it appears more as a factor that could influence political alignments ahead of the 2028 presidential election. The activity of recent months, the contacts between Nikos Christodoulides and Tufan Erhurman, the more active involvement of the United Nations and the discussion on the next steps, although they have ended in deadlock, have created a political environment within which different protagonists are seeking to position themselves.
The image
For Nikos Christodoulides, maintaining the image that something is moving on the Cyprus problem has obvious political significance. The President can present himself as the man who, after years of stagnation, is attempting to place the issue back on a path of substantive negotiations. This, regardless of the eventual outcome, potentially broadens his political audience.
Of particular importance is his relationship with the Democratic Rally (DISY) camp. Nikos Christodoulides was elected in 2023 against DISY’s official candidate, causing a deep rift with party headquarters on Pindarou Street. Three years later, however, he remains politically present among the party’s grassroots supporters. A recent IMR poll for Reporter recorded significant support for him among the party’s voters, at a time when the Cyprus problem has emerged as the primary criterion for 30% of DISY members when choosing a candidate for 2028.
In this context, genuine movement on the Cyprus problem could work to the President’s advantage. A segment of DISY, particularly those who place themselves within the Clerides school of thought and view a Cyprus settlement as a core ideological characteristic of the party, would find it more difficult to adopt a wholly confrontational stance towards a President engaged in a genuine negotiation process.
The appointment of Tornaritis
Within this framework, the appointment of Nikos Tornaritis also acquires additional political significance. On 16 September, the Council of Ministers appointed him Special Political Envoy of the President of the Republic for the Cyprus problem in countries across Asia and Africa. He is a historic DISY figure and the party’s former parliamentary spokesperson, and therefore a politician with a clear connection to the DISY camp.
Institutionally, the appointment can be explained as an effort to make use of an experienced politician in promoting the positions of the Republic of Cyprus. Politically, however, it cannot be entirely detached from developments within DISY. Party figures already view it as a move affecting internal balances, while Tornaritis himself had previously opposed any premature exclusion of Nikos Christodoulides from the broader centre-right camp’s options for 2028.
The line that can be advanced by Tornaritis’ side is clear: the Cyprus problem is a national and collective issue and, therefore, accepting a mission from the President does not automatically amount to political or electoral support for him. This is precisely what he emphasised in his first statement following the appointment, insisting on the national character of the mission. As long as there is a genuine prospect of progress, or at least a convincing appearance of one, this argument retains political credibility.
Averof’s equation
Averof Neophytou also enters the same equation, albeit from a different starting point. The former DISY president has directly linked his decisions regarding 2028 to developments in the Cyprus problem. He has stated that if an agreed strategic settlement framework emerges, he will stand alongside Nikos Christodoulides. Otherwise, as he himself put it, “everyone will make their own decisions”.
This position serves more than one political need at the same time. It allows Averof to bring the Cyprus problem back to the forefront, an area in which he has always invested politically, to appear consistent with the settlement-oriented line historically expressed by a significant part of DISY and, at the same time, to avoid becoming trapped from this stage in an internal party battle over the nomination.
Timing is also not irrelevant. The IMR poll currently shows Annita Demetriou leading among party members with 48%, compared with 36% for Averof Neophytou. This does not predetermine the outcome of a future internal process, but it does explain why shifting the discussion from the presidential candidacy to the Cyprus problem may be politically useful for the former DISY leader. It buys him time while allowing him to keep more than one option open.
His meeting with Nikos Christodoulides on 16 September reinforced this image. Averof repeated that the national issue stands “above all else” and that, in the event of a strategic agreement, the President will find him at his side.
Caution: Danger!
There is, however, a serious problem for everyone investing politically in a scenario of development… the developments themselves. Antonio Guterres’ statement on 17 September noticeably lowered expectations. The Secretary-General made clear that no 3+1 or 5+1 meeting is expected in New York, noting that “there is still a lot of work to be done”. The statement carries particular weight because it limits the impression that the process is already one step away from a substantive upgrade in negotiations.
And this is where the political risk lies for all three protagonists. Christodoulides needs tangible results to sustain the image of momentum. Tornaritis needs a genuine diplomatic role so that his appointment retains primarily its institutional character and is not interpreted solely through the prism of 2028. And Averof needs developments so that his decision to place the Cyprus problem above the presidential race remains politically justified.
Under these circumstances, the Cyprus problem is objectively becoming a field of domestic political realignment as well. This does not mean that the positions or initiatives of the three men are dictated exclusively by electoral calculations. It does mean, however, that the course of the national issue now has direct consequences for their personal political strategies.
If, by the end of the year, there is substantial movement, a new round of negotiations or a clear strategic settlement framework, their current moves may be viewed within a different political reality. If, on the contrary, the process remains confined to meetings, declarations of intent and confidence-building measures without substantive progress, then the equation changes.
In that case, Christodoulides, Tornaritis and Averof will be called upon to explain not only what they expected to happen on the Cyprus problem, but also why they invested so much political capital in the expectation that this time things would be different. For President Christodoulides, matters are entirely and readily explainable. For Tornaritis and Averof, the degree of difficulty is considerably higher, since, as prominent DISY figures, they will logically be judged and criticised for having poured water onto Nikos Christodoulides’ political mill.
