By Kriton Kapsalis
The Israeli strike of 18 August on Abu al-Duhur Airbase in northwestern Syria can hardly be regarded as just another Israeli Air Force raid against military installations on Syrian territory. This time, the true recipient of the message was not primarily Damascus. It was Ankara.The base, located approximately 70 kilometres from the Turkish border, was hit by at least eight bombs, which damaged its runways and hangars. No casualties were reported. More significant, however, was the justification offered by Israel: the Netanyahu government claimed that Turkish forces were about to be deployed at the facility and that such a development would constitute a threat to Israeli security.Turkey categorically rejects this version of events, maintaining that no Turkish forces were present at Abu al-Duhur. The Syrian government also says that it had assured Israel that no permanent Turkish base would be established there.Regardless of what exactly was being planned, however, the Israeli strike exposes a much more significant geopolitical reality: Turkey is emerging as one of Israel’s principal strategic rivals inside Syria.
From Iran to Turkey
For more than a decade, Israel’s strategy in Syria had a relatively clear objective: to prevent Iran and Hezbollah from establishing permanent military infrastructure close to Israel’s borders and to stop the transfer of advanced weapons systems to Lebanon.The overthrow of Bashar al-Assad in 2024 fundamentally changed the equation. Iranian influence was drastically reduced, while another regional actor emerged in its place: Turkey.Ankara developed close relations with the new government of Ahmed al-Sharaa and began actively participating in the training and reorganisation of the Syrian armed forces. Israeli concerns, therefore, do not relate solely to the presence of Turkish troops. They mainly concern the possibility of a permanent Turkish military architecture being established in Syria. Such an architecture could eventually include airbases, drones, electronic warfare systems and, most importantly, air-defence systems.For Israel, this would dramatically alter the operational environment.The Israeli Air Force has become accustomed to operating over Syrian airspace with considerable freedom. The deployment of modern Turkish air-defence systems could gradually restrict that freedom of movement.The message sent on 18 August therefore appears to have been pre-emptive: Israel does not intend to wait until Turkish military infrastructure has been installed before taking action.
The Warnings Came First
A particularly interesting aspect of the strike is that it did not take place without prior communication.On 14 August, just four days before the attack, Mossad chief Roman Gofman held a telephone conversation with Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani. According to information cited by Reuters, the issues discussed included Turkey’s growing military presence, arms sales and the provision of drones to the newly formed Syrian armed forces.This means that Israel had effectively warned Damascus.The Syrian side claims that it responded by saying that no permanent Turkish base was being planned and that the installation would remain under Syrian sovereignty. Israel nevertheless proceeded with the attack.This is perhaps where the most important political message lies: Tel Aviv does not consider assurances from Damascus sufficient when it comes to the Turkish military presence.
The Risk of an Israeli–Turkish Confrontation
The development is even more significant because Turkey and Israel are two of the region’s most powerful military actors.Until now, the two countries could exchange harsh political statements without confronting each other in the same theatre of operations. Syria is changing that reality.If Turkish forces, aircraft or air-defence systems are deployed at Syrian bases while Israel continues its air strikes, the risk increases of an incident that neither side had planned.This is precisely why the United States intervened.US special envoy Tom Barrack described the Israeli strike as an “unnecessary escalation” and revealed that Washington was working to establish a deconfliction mechanism involving Turkey, Israel and Syria. According to Barrack, Ankara was caught off guard by the strike, and there was a genuine risk of a military response.That alone demonstrates how dangerously the situation has changed.
A Struggle Over Who Will Control Post-Assad Syria
Behind the dispute over a single airbase lies a much larger question: who will define the strategic character of the new Syria?Turkey views post-Assad Syria as a natural sphere of political, economic and military influence. It invested in the Syrian opposition for years and today possesses a far greater capacity to influence Damascus.Israel, by contrast, wants a militarily constrained Syria, without powerful foreign forces and, above all, without military infrastructure capable of restricting Israeli air superiority.The two strategies are therefore largely incompatible.Turkey wants to acquire strategic depth in Syria.Israel wants to prevent any regional power from acquiring such depth close to its borders.The conflict of interests is almost structural.
The Eastern Mediterranean Dimension and Cyprus
The confrontation, however, is not confined to Syria.It forms part of a broader realignment of power in the Eastern Mediterranean, where Turkey and Israel have differing visions of the regional order.For Cyprus, this development is of particular interest.A more intense Israeli–Turkish rivalry is likely to increase the strategic importance of the Israel–Cyprus–Greece axis, particularly in the fields of defence, energy security, surveillance and intelligence sharing.This does not mean, however, that Nicosia stands to benefit from a military confrontation between Turkey and Israel. Quite the opposite. Such a crisis could transform the entire Eastern Mediterranean into an area of far greater military tension.For the Republic of Cyprus, therefore, strengthening relations with Israel represents a strategic advantage. Turning that relationship into part of an openly anti-Turkish military architecture, however, would also create serious risks.
Israel’s New “Red Line”
The most important conclusion to be drawn from Abu al-Duhur is that Israel appears to have established a new red line.For years, Israel’s red line in Syria concerned Iran and Hezbollah.It now includes Turkey as well.Israel does not appear to oppose every form of Turkish influence in Syria. It does, however, oppose a Turkish military presence that could restrict its operational freedom or create a new balance of power along its northern borders.The strike of 18 August demonstrated that Israel is prepared to use military force before such a presence becomes firmly established.This is what makes Abu al-Duhur so significant.It was not merely an attack on an old Syrian airbase. It was a warning to Ankara that Israel now regards the shaping of post-Assad Syria as a matter of vital national interest.At the same time, it was a warning to everyone that Syria, following the decline of Iranian influence, has not ceased to be an arena of rivalry among regional powers.The main protagonists have simply changed.
