By Andreas Gr. Orphanides*
Fifty-two years after the Turkish invasion of 1974, the Cyprus problem remains one of the most complex and enduring international issues. The latest shift in Turkish policy, with the official adoption of the position of "two sovereign states," diverges substantially from the agreed framework of negotiations of recent decades. Ankara argues that this solution reflects the realities that have taken shape on the island. However, an analysis of international law, European legal order, international practice and geopolitical developments leads to a different conclusion: that the two-state solution is unlikely to develop into an internationally accepted, functional and long-term viable settlement, and could entail significant costs, not only for Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, but for Turkey itself.
International law
The first and most substantial parameter concerns international law. The United Nations Security Council has repeatedly set out the framework for resolving the Cyprus problem. Resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984) declared the declaration of the secessionist entity in the north legally invalid and called on all states not to recognise it. This position is not a matter of political convenience, but the application of the fundamental principle of international law on the non-recognition of situations arising from the use of force. This principle has been applied repeatedly by the international community, precisely in order to prevent the creation of precedents that would undermine international peace and security. The international isolation of the secessionist regime for more than five decades demonstrates that the international community does not treat the Cyprus problem as a matter between two equal state entities, but as a matter of the unlawful division of an internationally recognised state [...].
European law and the acquis
A similar picture emerges at the European level. Since 2004, the Republic of Cyprus has been a full member state of the European Union. Protocol 10 of the Treaty of Accession provides that the application of the European acquis is suspended temporarily in the areas where the government does not exercise effective control, without, however, this calling into question the international sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus. The creation of a second sovereign state would require an unprecedented revision of the European legal framework, which does not appear politically feasible. In addition, it would raise serious questions concerning the application of European law, citizenship, free movement, the Union's external borders and the functioning of the single market.
Equally significant is the political dimension. A bizonal, bicommunal federation is not merely one of several possible options. It is the only basis for a solution that has been consistently accepted by the Security Council, the European Union and almost the entire international community. From the High-Level Agreements of 1977 and 1979 to the Guterres framework of 2017, every substantive effort at resolution has taken place within this framework. Abandoning it would, in effect, mean returning to square one, with no commonly accepted point of reference and no indication that a new process would attract broader international support.
International legitimacy and feasibility
Political reality therefore leads to a critical conclusion. The debate is not about which solution would be theoretically desirable for each side, but which possesses the necessary conditions for international legitimacy and feasibility. At this point, a second dimension begins to emerge, perhaps an even more important one: whether Turkey itself is actually serving its own long-term strategic interests by insisting on the two-state solution, or whether a different approach might ultimately prove more beneficial.
The answer to this question cannot be given in terms of power or military presence. Contemporary international politics is increasingly shaped by geoeconomics, energy interconnections, market access, supply chains and technological cooperation. Seen in this light, the continuation of today's impasse entails a significant opportunity cost for Turkey.
First, the existence of an unresolved Cyprus problem continues to affect its relations with the European Union. Despite periods of rapprochement, the Cyprus problem remains one of the most significant factors hindering the full development of EU-Turkey relations. The upgrading of the Customs Union, further economic integration, and the broadening of cooperation in the fields of energy, research, the digital economy and transport are all directly or indirectly linked to the wider political relationship between Ankara and Brussels. A comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem would not automatically eliminate every point of disagreement, but it would remove one of the most persistent long-term sources of tension.
Second, the energy geography of the Eastern Mediterranean is changing. Natural gas deposits, electricity interconnections, maritime transport and investment in renewable energy sources all require stability and trust. International energy companies and financial institutions invest more readily in regions where the rules are clear and political risks are limited. Resolving the Cyprus problem could transform Cyprus from a point of confrontation into a hub of regional cooperation, to the benefit of all states in the region, including Turkey.
Third, maintaining the current status quo entails a significant fiscal and economic burden. The economic support of the Turkish Cypriot sector, the maintenance of a strong military presence, and the need for ongoing political and administrative support are long-standing obligations for Ankara. By contrast, a functional federal solution, fully integrated into the European institutional framework, would create the conditions for gradual economic self-sufficiency, wider international financing, and the development of the entire island.
The realistic option
The argument that the two-state solution is the only realistic option because it reflects today's facts on the ground overlooks a basic principle of international diplomacy: that negotiations aim precisely at changing problematic realities, not at cementing them. If the international community were to legitimise every territorial change arising from military force, it would undermine the very principle of territorial integrity upon which the post-war international system rests.
The goal, therefore, is not for Turkey to be "defeated" at the negotiating table, but for a new strategic framework to be shaped in which the federal solution becomes more advantageous than maintaining the current impasse. The experience of major international settlements demonstrates that durable agreements are reached when all sides recognise that the benefits of cooperation outweigh the costs of conflict. The Republic of Cyprus, working closely with Greece and the European Union, can help shape such a framework.
At the same time, the legitimate security concerns of both communities must be addressed through a modern European security architecture. The experience of recent decades shows that security is not guaranteed solely through military presence, but through effective democratic institutions, an independent judiciary, protection of human rights, international implementation mechanisms, and strong European Union involvement in monitoring the agreement. The Cyprus problem can no longer be treated solely as a matter of the past. It is a question of European security, energy cooperation, regional stability and international legality. The choice between permanent partition and a functional federation is not simply a choice between two different constitutional models. It is a choice between two different visions for the future of the Eastern Mediterranean.
In conclusion, insistence on the two-state solution may appear to preserve Turkey's current strategic gains. In reality, however, it locks all sides into a prolonged state of uncertainty, international confrontation and limited prospects for development. History teaches that conflicts are not resolved when one side fully imposes its will upon the other, but when all sides come to understand that peace, stability and shared prosperity better serve their long-term national interests. This is, perhaps, the greatest challenge, but also the greatest opportunity, for Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the European Union in the decades ahead.
*University academic and anthropologist, former rector
