The leader of the Republican Turkish Party (CTP), Sıla Usar İncirli, used her first post-election visit to Ankara to deliver a message that went well beyond diplomatic courtesy. Elected party chair in November, İncirli arrived with a broad and layered political agenda, ranging from the deepening economic and social strain in the north to mounting legal risks around the Immovable Property Commission (IPC), warnings over Schengen-related border tightening on the Green Line, and a renewed call for early elections.
Officially framed as a “courtesy visit,” the programme unfolded as a substantive political outreach aimed at re-anchoring the Turkish Cypriot position in Ankara while projecting a clear demand for change at home. İncirli’s meetings and public remarks underscored CTP’s assessment that years of diplomatic inertia have come at a tangible cost, eroding hard-won ground established by Turkish Cypriots in 2004 and again at the 2017 Crans-Montana talks.
A deliberate message
İncirli’s Ankara schedule spanned political parties, civil society and policy circles. She held talks with Republican People’s Party (CHP) leader Özgür Özel at CHP headquarters, met ruling AK Party deputy chair Mustafa Elitaş, engaged with civil society representatives and the board of the Gazeteciler Cemiyeti, and delivered a keynote lecture at TEPAV titled “The New Situation in Cyprus.” The visit concluded with an extended briefing for a group of journalists, during which İncirli laid out CTP’s assessment of the political landscape.
The breadth of the programme was no coincidence. CTP officials described the visit as an effort to restore multi-channel engagement with Ankara and to underline that developments in Cyprus have legal, economic and strategic implications for Türkiye as well as for Turkish Cypriots.
The ground lost after Crans-Montana
At the heart of İncirli’s analysis was a sharp critique of the period following the collapse of UN-sponsored talks at Crans-Montana in 2017. She argued that, in the nearly eight years since then, the Turkish Cypriot side has effectively ceased to be a proactive participant in peace efforts, a vacuum that has carried a heavy price.
According to İncirli, the five-year term of TC leader Ersin Tatar prolonged the standstill that steadily eroded the Turkish Cypriot side’s historical advantages. The decisive “yes” vote by Turkish Cypriots in the 2004 Annan Plan referendum, which demonstrated a strong and credible commitment to a comprehensive settlement, and the constructive stance adopted by the Turkish Cypriot delegation at Crans-Montana, gradually faded from international memory.
“What was proven in 2004 and again in 2017 has become invisible,” İncirli said in her briefing. “The clear will of Turkish Cypriots for a solution has been blurred, while Greek Cypriot intransigence has, over time, ceased to be recognised as such.” She warned that this loss of visibility is not merely symbolic but has translated into concrete legal and political risks.
IPC alarm bells
Those risks are most acute, she said, in the case of the Immovable Property Commission (IPC), long regarded as a cornerstone of the Turkish Cypriot side’s legal defence in property disputes. Established after the 2004 referendum and recognised by the European Court of Human Rights as an effective domestic remedy, the IPC has shielded both Turkish Cypriots and Türkiye from a flood of direct cases in Strasbourg.
To date, around 8,300 applications have been filed with the IPC, with roughly 2,300 concluded. Compensation payments in 2024 alone exceeded £120 million, underscoring that the mechanism continues to function. Yet Greek Cypriot lobbying, focused on claims of slow processing and delayed payments, has gained traction in the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers. Support for motions questioning the IPC’s status has risen from eight votes two years ago to 21 in the most recent round, leaving the commission perilously close to losing its standing as an accepted domestic remedy.
“This was our fortress,” İncirli said, warning that its collapse would expose Türkiye to far heavier compensation claims. She directly linked the IPC’s vulnerability to the post-Crans-Montana diplomatic freeze, arguing that the absence of a visible peace effort has allowed the Greek Cypriot side to shape the narrative unchallenged.
CHP talks
İncirli’s meeting with Özgür Özel at CHP headquarters illustrated CTP’s effort to broaden its Ankara outreach. While formally a courtesy call, the talks delved into substantive cooperation, including Cyprus policy coordination and joint work under the Socialist International umbrella. The IPC, property rights and the wider implications of diplomatic inertia were central themes.
CTP’s delegation included foreign relations secretary Fikri Toros and so education secretary Feriha Tel, reinforcing the institutional nature of the visit. The CHP’s political academy model was also discussed, reflecting CTP’s interest in strengthening its organisational capacity.
Schengen, visibility and security concerns
Another strand of İncirli’s message concerned what she described as the growing “invisibility” of Turkish Cypriots on the international stage. She criticised the conduct of the Greek Cypriot administration’s EU Council presidency preparations, saying the process has unfolded as if the north of the island did not exist.
The prospect of Cyprus joining the Schengen area featured prominently in her warnings. Tighter controls along the Green Line, she said, risk turning it into a de facto hard border, with serious social and economic consequences for Turkish Cypriots. These concerns, she noted, were conveyed directly to her Ankara interlocutors.
Security developments also drew criticism. İncirli pointed to defence agreements between the Greek Cypriot side, the United States and Israel, as well as growing militarisation linked to EU security initiatives. “Decisions taken without any say from Turkish Cypriots put the entire island at risk,” she said, arguing that the internationally recognised status of the south has been used to marginalise the north.
Domestically, İncirli used the Ankara visit to reinforce CTP’s call for early elections in northern Cyprus. She cited spiralling living costs, high inflation, a widening budget deficit projected at 26 billion Turkish lira for 2026, and the expansion of the informal economy as sources of widespread public frustration.
Recent corruption cases, including the arrest of senior officials such as the head of the Central Tender Commission and the prime minister’s undersecretary, were described as symptoms of a deepening crisis of trust in governance. İncirli argued that early elections in the first half of 2026 are becoming unavoidable, adding that she sensed a similar expectation among some of her Ankara contacts.
A message beyond courtesy
İncirli’s first Ankara visit as CTP leader thus carried a message that was political, strategic and urgent. By linking the loss of diplomatic ground since Crans-Montana to today’s legal and economic vulnerabilities, she sought to reframe the Cyprus question as an issue with immediate consequences rather than an abstract, frozen dispute.
The core message was blunt: prolonged silence and inaction have a cost. For Turkish Cypriots, that cost is measured in lost visibility, weakened legal defences and deepening economic strain. For Türkiye, İncirli warned, it could soon translate into heavier legal and financial burdens unless the ground lost since 2017 is actively reclaimed.