The logic of reciprocity has now seeped into every discussion with Turkish Cypriots on the Cyprus problem.
We understand that a settlement must benefit all Cypriots, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots alike. However, we consider that President Nikos Christodoulides’s decision to introduce this term even into confidence-building measures, which are necessary to improve the climate, may prove problematic.
Let us approach this through what I consider a real dilemma: when does reciprocity function as a tool for progress, and when does it become an obstacle? Is the view correct that excessive emphasis on reciprocity can distort the nature of confidence-building measures and send the wrong political signals, or not?
The value
Reciprocity is necessary when discussing the substance of the Cyprus problem. But when it becomes a universal filter applied to every aspect of contact with Turkish Cypriots, it loses its negotiating value and begins to operate as a brake. Confidence-building measures, by their nature, were not designed as “trade-offs” but as mechanisms for de-escalation and familiarisation between the two communities.
Especially in a prolonged deadlock, the over-politicisation of confidence-building measures can produce the opposite outcome: not the building of trust, but the institutionalisation of suspicion.
Crossing points
The opening of, or facilitation of movement through, crossing points primarily concerns the daily lives of citizens: enclaved people, workers, students, families, older people. Subjecting such measures to a strict “give-and-take” logic distorts their character and risks turning them into hostages of political balances that the communities themselves do not control.
At this point, the criticism of Nikos Christodoulides and Tufan Erhürman touches on a genuine concern. Ordinary citizens ask themselves: if confidence-building measures cannot move forward even in low-politics areas, if politicians cannot, in simple terms, open a road, then what exactly is the space for rapprochement?
International expectation
We must acknowledge that the Republic of Cyprus, as the only internationally recognised state, bears a particular responsibility to be, and to appear, flexible and generous. This is not merely a moral argument but also a strategic advantage that has historically been used to strengthen the international legitimacy of its positions. An excessive emphasis on parity of actions can blur this image and weaken the narrative of asymmetry, which is a key element of the Greek Cypriot argument.
That flexibility in managing crossing points, despite the fact that their opening did not begin with a Greek Cypriot initiative, provided a powerful political argument. It largely undermined the central position of Rauf Denktaş and Ankara that the two communities cannot live together and must therefore move towards a two-state logic. Since 2003 there have been hundreds of millions of crossings by Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, millions of overnight stays in accommodation in the northern and southern parts of the country without problems, and thousands of joint events and activities at political, cultural and broader social level without incident.
The question of indirect recognition
We all understand, of course, that this is not enough, since 52 years on Cyprus remains de facto divided. It is therefore understandable that some argue it is time to discuss substance and set confidence-building measures aside. Both leaders, Christodoulides and Erhürman, agree on this. Where do they disagree? Erhürman sets a timetable for the outcome of talks and proposes penalties for whoever says no again.
This position is not accepted by the Greek Cypriot side, so the United Nations turned again to confidence-building measures to buy time for everyone. Judging by the recent remarks of the UN Secretary-General’s personal envoy, María Ángela Holguín, the United Nations appears to be throwing up its hands. On the one hand, Nikos Christodoulides is again saying no, raising the issue of reciprocity, while Tufan Erhürman is waiting for Ankara to give the green light so that he can act with greater flexibility.
Reciprocity
What could replace the logic of reciprocity promoted by Nikos Christodoulides? If the Republic of Cyprus must be not only flexible but also more generous, is it reasonable to set limits and conditions?
Reciprocity could stop appearing problematic if it ceased to be framed in absolute terms. Instead of that absolute position, the Republic of Cyprus could adopt a framework of “asymmetrical responsibility with clauses”. That is: greater flexibility from the Greek Cypriot side, as the stronger side, but not unconditionally. One would expect the same from the stronger Turkey vis-à-vis the Republic of Cyprus. Instead of President Erdoğan intimidating Greek Cypriots by saying “we will come one night”, he could proceed with a gesture of goodwill.
The Republic of Cyprus, as an internationally recognised EU member state and the holder of legal sovereignty, could, as an expression of institutional self-confidence, move first in low-politics areas without demanding an immediate quid pro quo. This flexibility should be directed at citizens and communities, and should concern everyday issues. It cannot, of course, extend to so-called state structures. Generosity, in short, is legitimate and productive when it concerns crossing points, work, health, the environment, natural disasters, education and culture, on the logic that all of these will at some point connect with the settlement framework, making it more functional from the outset. The President of the Republic had previously announced that he was ready for such moves, but in the end nothing happened.
Recognition
If the Christodoulides policy remains rigidly and obsessively anchored in reciprocity, in the style of “we do not agree to opening a crossing point at Mia Milia because it politically favours and economically serves only Turkish Cypriots”, then the message sent may become dangerous. First, a member of government would need to substantiate, with evidence and documentation, that opening that crossing point serves the Turkish Cypriot side unilaterally. At the same time, the fear must be addressed that an insistence on applying reciprocity on equal terms to confidence-building measures could amount to indirect, albeit clear, recognition of a state in the north. Some consider this view exaggerated, since political recognition does not arise so easily from practical arrangements or technical understandings, particularly when these are explicitly made within the framework of inter-communal contacts and UN resolutions. On the other hand, the risk of symbolic misinterpretations exists.
Conclusion
In conclusion, reciprocity cannot be turned into an end in itself, especially when it concerns measures that directly affect daily life and the rapprochement of the two communities.
Crossing points should not be drawn into the logic of a flawed equation. On the contrary, facilitating the movement of people and goods is a practical necessity. It cannot be treated as a political “trade-off”, nor placed within a “give-and-take” framework that implies state parity. Movement of people on both sides of the crossing points sends a message of cooperation between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots at all levels and facilitates efforts towards a settlement.
Adopting a “narrow” logic of reciprocity is interpreted as a loss of the moral and political advantage of the Greek Cypriot side, which resorts to such small-scale political offsets not because it has factored in the communities affected, but because in reality it is not ready for a solution.