*By Nikola Xenophontos
After the latest meeting between Christodoulides and Erhürman on 8 May, Guterres appears to be positioning the new initiative on the Cyprus problem for after the parliamentary elections and after the completion of Cyprus’ Presidency of the Council of the EU. This is because the Cyprus problem does not evolve in a political vacuum.
At the latest Christodoulides-Erhürman meeting, the two leaders agreed on a number of low-political-intensity confidence-building measures, such as the establishment of a framework for the participation of civil society, preparations for a framework governing religious services, cooperation on tackling foot-and-mouth disease, and the creation of a new subcommittee within the framework of the Technical Committee on Economic and Commercial Affairs.
These developments should naturally not be underestimated, but they do not carry substantial weight regarding the Turkey factor. Immediately after the meeting, Christodoulides referred to an “informal expanded conference during the summer”. He himself declares that he is ready.
The crucial question, however, is why Turkey would choose to engage meaningfully in such a process. At the same time, neither does the Turkish Cypriot side appear ready for an immediate transition to a new conference, insisting instead on a step-by-step process.
Erdoğan’s Response to Guterres
When Erdoğan and Guterres met, the latter asked for the Turkish President’s assistance on the Cyprus issue. Erdoğan, however, told the UN Secretary-General that he had made major efforts without any result, noting that the problem lies elsewhere — and not with him — implying the Greek Cypriot side. In conclusion, he effectively gave Guterres free rein to do as he saw fit.
And so Guterres, with his immense Job-like patience, is trying to hand something over to the next Secretary-General. But why ask for Erdoğan’s help in the first place when Turkey is moving towards a two-state solution? Is that not a contradiction in itself?
Erdoğan did not need to ideologically believe in two states in order to promote them. It was enough that such rhetoric served his interests as long as the Greek Cypriot side failed to give Turkey a reason to seriously return to a federal framework.
Christodoulides
Christodoulides has stated that Turkey will only move when the benefits of a solution outweigh the benefits of non-solution. Yet not only does he fail to offer anything that might entice Turkey — such as a package involving an upgraded customs union, natural gas through a pipeline to Turkey, SAFE, and so on — but through his clumsy moves he is also trying to destroy whatever positive elements still exist in the Cyprus issue.
Not only are we failing to utilise energy resources through Turkey in order to give it a reason to withdraw from our territories, but as the Republic of Cyprus we are attempting to eliminate that possibility altogether through a commercial agreement with Egypt, bypassing both Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots.
But that was apparently not enough. We continue criticising the UN, while completely failing to connect the Cypriot EU Presidency with the national issue. Instead, the focus remains solely on energy. Yet the energy plans moved ahead without the consent of the Turkish Cypriots and not through Turkey. So what exactly is our President trying to achieve? What message is he trying to send to Turkey? And what exactly is that message?
The Behind-the-Scenes Developments
Following the Christodoulides-Erhürman meeting and the agreement on four low-political-intensity confidence-building measures, Christodoulides spoke not only about a “summer expanded conference”, but also about a plan for resolving the Cyprus problem before the end of 2026. He appears to base this optimism on the new momentum created after the Guterres-Erdoğan meeting, on EU support, and on contacts with the UN Secretary-General’s envoy.
The President referred to backstage diplomatic efforts that began after the Guterres-Erdoğan meeting, while clarifying that he himself has not met with the Turkish President. This in itself is not paradoxical; diplomacy often operates through intermediaries. The real question is different: if the process requires low tones and discretion, why is Nicosia publicly transforming it into expectations of a settlement plan before it is even clear whether there is common ground with the Turkish Cypriot side and Turkey?
The European framework already points in this direction through the new European Parliament resolution on Cyprus, which, while condemning Turkey’s stance on critical issues, simultaneously recognises the need for cooperation with Turkey at a European level.
Nicosia, however, does not appear to be doing this. Instead of using the European discussion as leverage for a solution, it is using it primarily as a platform for projecting the Republic of Cyprus.
The same applies to energy. If Turkey holds the key, then natural gas is one of the few practical tools capable of changing Ankara’s calculations. But if that tool becomes disconnected from the solution process and locked into a route bypassing Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, then Nicosia is not increasing the value of a solution. It is reducing it.
Guterres’ initiative requires not only incentives for Turkey. It also requires a climate of trust with the Turkish Cypriot side and the United Nations.
The new Guterres initiative, therefore, will not be judged by whether Christodoulides declares himself ready for a conference. It will be judged by whether Nicosia can create the conditions that would make such a conference meaningful.
If Turkey holds the key, as the President himself admits, then the policy of the Republic of Cyprus must answer one simple question: what is it doing to make a solution more beneficial than non-solution?
So far, the answer is not convincing. Nicosia is not building a European package of incentives, is not turning energy into a common tool for a settlement, is not sufficiently cultivating trust with the Turkish Cypriot side, and is not protecting the positive climate the UN needs in order to move forward.
Guterres may open a window. Turkey may calculate its interests. Europe may offer a framework. But Nicosia must have a strategy.
And that is where the problem lies. The Christodoulides obstacle is not that he talks about a solution. It is that he talks about a solution without making a solution more likely. Without making it more beneficial. Without making it more credible.
If the new Guterres initiative is lost, Turkey will not be the only one to blame. Nicosia will also bear responsibility for seeing the window open and, instead of filling it with strategy, treating it as yet another opportunity for communication management.
