By Pavlos M. Pavlou
In 1870, Prussian chancellor Otto von Bismarck wanted to push events towards the unification of the German states. To achieve this, he knew he would need to do three things: force a confrontation with France, which opposed unification, unite the Germans militarily through a war, and bypass the reservations of the Prussian king, Wilhelm, about declaring war.
Wilhelm was holidaying in the small town of Bad Ems, where the French ambassador visited him to discuss the question of succession to the Spanish throne. After the meeting, Wilhelm sent an informational telegram to Bismarck. Bismarck took the telegram, cut sections from it until what remained was a dry message that read as an insult to France, and released it to the press. The French were outraged and declared war. The Germans united and defeated France. In 1871, Germany was unified.
In 1946, the American diplomat and historian George Kennan sent a telegram to the State Department on how to contain Soviet influence. He later published it under the pseudonym "Mr X." This text inspired Truman's policy of containment through military, political and economic control of geopolitically critical countries, including the Marshall Plan.
Around the same time, Stalin's associate Andrei Zhdanov announced a policy of blocking Western influence from Soviet society, sealing the hardening of the Soviet stance towards the West.
The first text led to the Truman Doctrine. The second became known to history as the Zhdanov Doctrine. Together, they shaped the framework of the Cold War.
In 1948, Kennan proposed opening a constructive dialogue with the USSR. Truman rejected it, and the diplomat's influence faded from that point on. Zhdanov died the same year. The Cold War, however, lasted for almost half a century.
The Greek Cypriot doctrine
On 28 January 2026, at a meeting with María Angela Holguín and Tufan Erhürman, President Nikos Christodoulides put forward a five-point procedural proposal. Its central element was a request for the United Nations to begin recording the convergences reached so far in the Cyprus talks. Once complete, this text would be given to both sides for comments, with the aim of agreeing on what has already been agreed.
On the surface, the proposal sounds reasonable. So why did Holguín and Guterres reportedly react with bitter laughter? Because they know that no statement, text or proposal is ever only what it appears to be on its face, and they know what such a process would mean in practice: at least another five years of talks over what counts as an agreed convergence and what does not.
The 2017 to 2023 period was the exception. Back then, complete inertia on the Cyprus problem was useful, not least because it allowed time to sell large numbers of "golden passports," and it allowed Mustafa Akıncı's term to come to an end, the "two state" policy to be cemented by Ankara and Ersin Tatar, and the previously agreed convergences to be blurred to the point of being effectively cancelled. That is exactly what happened.
The norm since 1977, however, has been mild or intense movement on the issue. This is, in fact, the approach successive Greek Cypriot leaderships have settled on, for two reasons. First, the absence of movement tends to push the Cyprus problem into the background for the international diplomatic community and risks normalising the status quo. Second, inertia creates friction, an absence of basic coordination, and episodes of tension.
On this basis, every president of the Republic of Cyprus, whatever their actual intentions, has always sought some form of movement, with the sole exception of the 2017 to 2023 period. Even Tassos Papadopoulos did so, immediately after the 2004 referendum, through the Gambari paper and the Djoni-Perdev meetings, among other initiatives.
How the doctrine has evolved
From 2023 to the present, the Greek Cypriot doctrine has evolved further. It has kept its outward form when it comes to mobilising the international community, and has become even more assertive, with constant pressure for the involvement of the UN, the EU and individual major powers. At the same time, however, the Greek Cypriot leader has pursued a policy of decoupling this international mobilisation from two other related factors.
The first is general foreign policy. In international forums and bilateral relations, President Christodoulides pursues a policy that is sharply anti-Turkish while simultaneously isolating Turkish Cypriots. Every "alliance," agreement and "initiative" in foreign policy carries this same underlying logic. Even where the substantive results are negative, the old Lyssarides era idea of imposing a "cost on Turkey" remains the core of his approach.
The trilateral arrangements may have proven hollow, and the "alliance" with Netanyahu may have turned the areas under government control into something resembling an Israeli protectorate without anything given in return, but this policy line has remained constant: act in ways that provoke Ankara and fully isolate Turkish Cypriots, regardless of the outcome. Against this backdrop, talk of a "positive agenda" or of using EU Turkey relations to advance progress on the Cyprus problem is, at best, something of a joke.
The second factor is domestic politics. Domestically, President Christodoulides's policy is entirely disconnected from the supposed goal of movement on the Cyprus problem. In practice, it works against that goal in two ways. On the domestic front, he maintains steady coordination with the most extreme elements of the political system, those who are fiercely opposed to any solution, as well as with the broader network of commentators who shape public opinion aligned with them.
He also consistently introduces new conditions into discussions with Turkish Cypriots that have the effect of guaranteeing stagnation. One example is the "principle of reciprocity" applied to the opening of new crossing points, which in practice means that unless the other side concedes everything Nicosia wants, no new crossing will open. Another is the "principle of non-recognition," which in practice means that a solar park project, itself an EU proposal, will not go ahead unless Nicosia receives all of the electricity generated and only then decides how much, if any, to share.
The most active form of inertia
Through this contradictory approach, President Christodoulides secures a series of advantages.
He maintains high approval ratings for his foreign policy. Abroad, everyone understands what he is doing and takes advantage of it, but this does not concern him. What matters to him is what the domestic audience believes.
He preserves the alibi of "but I want a solution," which he can draw on in 2028 to appeal to voters who support a settlement, including some or all of DISY's base.
He reassures those who do not want a solution at all, since they are confident that what he says abroad is not what he actually means.
He maintains a form of virtual movement on the issue, one that is likely to continue in 2027 under the next UN secretary general, so that by the 2028 elections the engines of the Cyprus problem will appear to be running, even if the handbrake is never released.
And he provides a convenient alibi for those who, whether for self-interested or genuinely well-meaning reasons, want to believe he is pursuing real movement and a genuine solution, and who therefore choose to align themselves with him.
It is against this backdrop that the new UN initiative is now beginning. Readers are free to hope for whatever outcome they wish.
A few missteps worth noting
On the Turkish Cypriot side, the long-standing CTP position that no solution to the Cyprus problem can emerge without Ankara's consent is not unreasonable. Tufan Erhürman's reluctance to "empty out" his position through public statements that might provoke Erdoğan is, to a degree, understandable. However, his insistence on the condition that Turkish Cypriots should not return to isolation if a new round of negotiations fails because of the Greek Cypriot side is unrealistic. His recent softening of this language is not enough. A condition of this kind places what is, in practice, an almost insurmountable obstacle in the path of the process.
A similar misstep can be seen in Erhürman's reaction to the EU's role in the negotiations, an unnecessary point of friction. The EU is not seeking to replace the UN, and there is broad agreement that it will have a say given that any state emerging from a settlement would be an EU member. Brussels has already shown how constructively it can contribute, not only through the EU Turkey agenda, even if Cyprus does not make full use of it, but also through what came before: for two years, from 2015 to 2017, the EU's envoy, Pieter Van Nuffel, worked to align each convergence with the EU acquis, helping bring the talks to what was, at the time, the closest point yet to a settlement.
A further misstep concerns developments on the Greek Cypriot side. The "three friends" formation, DISY, ELAM and DIKO, was confirmed again in the handling of committee chairmanships in the new parliament. Beyond the troubling inclusion of ELAM in this arrangement, it also appears to be setting the stage for the presidential election, with an eye already on a possible second round. The open question is whether Annita Demetriou is helping to build this configuration in order to improve her own chances of being elected president, or whether she will ultimately hand it over as a dowry to President Christodoulides.
