By Andreas Paraschos
The Pulse poll commissioned by DISY, parts of which were published yesterday by Phileleftheros and whose detailed tables were revealed by Politis, is not merely an early ranking of possible candidates for the 2028 presidential election. More importantly, it is an X-ray of the current political landscape: DISY's identity crisis, Christodoulides' resilience, AKEL's options and, above all, the dramatic absence of the Cyprus issue from the political system's real priorities.
Poll numbers are not prophecies. They capture public sentiment at a specific moment rather than definitive electoral decisions. Yet when the same trends are repeated across different scenarios, they form a political message that none of the major parties can afford to ignore.
The first and most important finding concerns DISY. The party that governed Cyprus for two consecutive presidential terms still has not answered the fundamental question that emerged after its defeat in 2023: what kind of political force does it actually want to be?
If it wishes to be a force for European-oriented reform and a solution to the Cyprus problem, it must demonstrate that through its actions. If, instead, it chooses to compete with Christodoulides, DIKO and ELAM in the realm of conservatism, symbolism and the management of national anxieties, it should recognise that its rivals operate more comfortably in that arena and without the burden of its own historical contradictions.
The recent visit by the UN Secretary-General to Cyprus was a revealing test. The UN chief visited the island for the first time in sixteen years in an effort to prevent a definitive slide toward partition. Yet DISY did not seize the opportunity to hold President Christodoulides accountable and demand concrete initiatives, a timetable and a return to the convergences achieved up to Crans-Montana.
Rather than attempting to make the Cyprus issue the central subject of public debate, it joined the dispute over identity cards. Whatever one's views on that controversy, it ultimately served as another convenient curtain behind which the real issues disappeared: What exactly did Nikos Christodoulides propose to Antonio Guterres? What was the Turkish side's response? What steps were agreed? And why, three and a half years after assuming the presidency, has there still not been a single substantive negotiating session on a final Cyprus settlement?
By doing so, DISY effectively handed the initiative entirely to the President. It allowed him to shape the narrative around his contacts, present the mere preservation of a process as progress and avoid giving an account of his performance. It failed to exert the pressure one would expect from a party that still invokes the legacy of Glafcos Clerides.
And this is where the deeper weakness lies, one not reflected in Pulse's tables: none of the figures competing for influence within DISY appears to regard the solution of the Cyprus problem as a central political objective. They discuss who can defeat Christodoulides, but not the policies with which they would govern. They measure potential voter transfers, party consolidation and personal popularity, yet do not explain what they would do in the face of the threat of permanent partition.
The poll, however, is uncompromising regarding the party's internal equation. Annita Demetriou appears today as the only option capable of retaining a significant part of DISY's electoral base, limiting defections to Nikos Christodoulides and mounting a credible challenge for a place in the second round. She records 24% in the four-way scenario and 27% in the three-way one, while retaining 53% of DISY voters.
By contrast, a new candidacy by Averof Neophytou leaves DISY on 15% or 20%, depending on the scenario, while allowing Christodoulides to attract 38% of the party's previous vote. The numbers leave little room for alternative interpretations. Should Averof insist on running, he would not merely be pursuing a personal comeback. He would be risking a second, and likely more painful, defeat for DISY while opening the door wide to Christodoulides' re-election.
In 2023, the conflict at the top of DISY kept the party's official candidate out of the runoff and drove a large section of its supporters into the camp of Anastasiades' former government spokesman. Repeating the same conflict in 2028 could no longer be dismissed as an accident. It would amount to deliberate political self-destruction.
Based on current data, Annita Demetriou has the strongest electoral starting point. But that does not mean she already has a political platform.
To transform her polling advantage into a genuine path to power, she must answer two difficult questions:
- Can she impose unity on a party still burdened by unresolved rivalries and competing personal strategies?
- Can she articulate a clear political line, particularly on the Cyprus issue, that meaningfully distinguishes her from Nikos Christodoulides?
The current President is not unbeatable. Nineteen per cent in spontaneous suitability ratings does not constitute political dominance. In scenarios involving Annita Demetriou, his support falls to 22% or 26%, and he even risks missing the runoff. Yet when he faces weaker DISY alternatives, he climbs as high as 34%.
His strength, therefore, is not entirely his own. It is also fuelled by Pindarou's weaknesses, divisions and strategic mistakes.
On AKEL's side, Andreas Mavroyiannis emerges as the only clear and dependable horse in the race, at least for now. He records between 30% and 38% in every scenario and demonstrates resilience regardless of who stands against him.
More importantly, he has appeal beyond AKEL's traditional left-wing base. Compared with Stefanos Stefanou, he appears both more broadly acceptable and electorally stronger.
Mavroyiannis, however, faces a serious political question of his own.
For nearly a decade he served as Nikos Anastasiades' negotiator. Few people know better what happened at Crans-Montana, which opportunities existed, which convergences were achieved and why the process collapsed. It is therefore not enough for him to present himself as Christodoulides' respectable and moderate opponent. He must also provide convincing answers regarding his own role during the Anastasiades decade and explain what he would do differently as President.
The broader picture, then, is not that the 2028 presidential election already has three frontrunners.
Rather, it is that the political system has begun assigning horses and riders before deciding where it wants to take the country.
And while everyone is examining who can reach the second round, very few are asking whether, by 2028, there will still be a road back to a federal solution.
Polls can measure who might become President.
They cannot measure whether, by the time that person is elected, there will still be a Cyprus problem left to solve, or merely a partition left to manage.
