Turkey’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan took aim at the Republic of Cyprus during a visit to Vienna last week, suggesting that a country “with a population of less than one million” can obstruct broader strategic cooperation between Europe and Turkey.
Speaking at a joint press conference with his Austrian counterpart Beate Meinl-Reisinger, Fidan argued that when Europe and Turkey “come together”, they form a space of 500 million people with significant potential for cooperation. However, he added, such a prospect can be largely blocked by a small country, “without anyone being able to say anything”.
A claim that appears logical — at first glance
Fidan’s remarks are neither accidental nor naïve. They belong to a category of arguments that can sound reasonable at first hearing, but begin to unravel under closer scrutiny.
On one level, the idea of stronger Europe–Turkey cooperation is not unfounded. The relationship carries substantial economic, energy and geopolitical weight. Turkey remains a key partner for the European Union across multiple areas, from migration to security and trade.
Economically, Turkey ranks among the world’s 20 largest economies, with a nominal GDP of around $1.1–1.2 trillion in recent years, while the EU’s economy is roughly ten times larger, at around $16–17 trillion. The potential for synergy is real — but the question remains whether that alone is sufficient.
The EU is more than economics
The European Union is not a loose alliance of interests where participation depends solely on economic weight. It is a system governed by rules, procedures and, crucially, shared values.
This is where the core contradiction in Fidan’s argument emerges. A country cannot seek deeper integration into such a framework while simultaneously questioning or bypassing its fundamental principles.
These are not peripheral issues.
- Concerns persist over freedom of expression, with organisations such as the Committee to Protect Journalists placing Turkey among countries with high numbers of detained journalists and media workers.
- On the rule of law, while Turkey formally maintains institutions associated with a constitutional state, international indices — including Freedom House and the World Justice Project — have repeatedly highlighted issues such as limited judicial independence, political interference and the imprisonment of political opponents, including figures such as Ekrem İmamoğlu.
- Turkey’s foreign policy operates along a dual track of cooperation and tension. While it maintains partnerships with neighbouring countries in trade, energy and security, it also exhibits a consistent pattern of friction.
This is evident in its relations with Greece — including longstanding threats such as casus belli — and with the Cyprus, where part of the island remains under Turkish control. Similar dynamics are seen in Syria, alongside fluctuating tensions with Israel. Airspace violations, disputes over maritime zones and rhetoric that at times escalates to threats of force all contribute to a complex and often contradictory picture.
Cyprus as a convenient narrative
Against this backdrop, framing the problem as a “small country blocking progress” appears less a description and more a political choice.
The reference to a country of under one million people shifts attention away from Turkey’s own unresolved issues and towards a simpler, more digestible narrative: that a minor actor is holding back a major strategic relationship.
The key question is whether Ankara genuinely believes that the Republic of Cyprus is the sole obstacle to its relations with the EU. If so, it risks underestimating its counterparts. If not, then the framing appears deliberate.
A broader European tendency
This narrative is not confined to Ankara. At times, voices within Europe also adopt the notion of a “Cyprus obstacle”, finding it more convenient than addressing the deeper structural challenges in EU–Turkey relations.
As an EU member state, Cyprus is entitled to have its position taken into account — just as smaller states elsewhere in the Union are, particularly when their security concerns are at stake.
Ultimately, EU–Turkey relations do not falter because of a single member state. They are hindered by a broader incompatibility between expectations and actual practices.
Until that gap is addressed, the vision of a 500-million-strong cooperative space will remain more political slogan than realistic plan.
What if Turkey shifted on Cyprus?
The analysis also raises a hypothetical question: if Turkey were to take a substantive step towards resolving the Cyprus issue — not symbolic, but meaningful, such as accepting a settlement framework, reducing troop presence or recognising the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus — would Cyprus still constitute a barrier?
In such a case, Cyprus would be unlikely to remain the central obstacle. Its veto power is not arbitrary, but linked to an unresolved conflict directly affecting an EU member state. Progress on that front would significantly reduce its political weight.