Three years after its establishment, the Anti-Corruption Authority is unable to conduct independent criminal investigations into corruption cases, as the parliamentary majority did not grant it investigative powers, despite warnings from the legal community that this was an imperative necessity.
During its three years of operation, the Anti-Corruption Authority recommended to the Attorney General that criminal investigations be conducted into possible acts of corruption against:
- Former Minister of Agriculture Nicos Kouyialis, former Director of the Department of Fisheries Loizos Loizides and former Director of the Department of Environment Costas Hadjipanayiotou, in relation to the development in Trimiklini and the diversion of water from the Kouris river.
- EDEK MP Marinos Sizopoulos, in connection with the alleged securing of a “golden” passport through false representations.
- The former Director General of the Sewerage Board of Limassol and current Director General of the Nicosia District Organisation, Constantinos Parmaklis, for alleged breaches of the law governing tender procedures and the award of a contract to a relative.
In addition, the Anti-Corruption Authority examined five complaints to date against the Deputy Attorney General, Savvas Angelides, without any criminal wrongdoing being established.
Three years on, the Authority remains unable to conduct independent criminal investigations, as it was not granted investigative powers by Parliament, despite repeated warnings from the legal community that such powers were essential.
If it had investigative powers
If the Anti-Corruption Authority had investigative powers, criminal investigations into corruption cases would not be conducted by the Police under the supervision of the Law Office, but by independent criminal investigators appointed directly by the Authority. In cases involving current or former high-ranking officials, investigators could be appointed from abroad to ensure full independence and impartiality.
Under such a framework, the content of investigations and evidentiary material would not become known to third parties, reducing the risk of leaks and, by extension, threats to witnesses. Crucially, there would be no scope for interference in investigative work aimed at covering up cases. The findings of criminal investigations would be submitted to the Attorney General, accompanied by a clear and reasoned recommendation from the Authority as to whether criminal prosecution should be pursued. Even if the leadership of the Law Office wished not to proceed with prosecutions despite such a recommendation, this would be extremely difficult in practice, as they would be required to provide convincing and documented explanations for not initiating proceedings, notwithstanding the existence of sufficient evidence gathered by the Authority.
The Marinos Sizopoulos case
A characteristic example is the case of former EDEK president and MP Marinos Sizopoulos. Had the Authority possessed investigative powers, it would have continued its own investigation after identifying potential acts of corruption and would have reached a final conclusion with a clear recommendation as to whether prosecution should be initiated.
However, as it lacks such powers, its report was forwarded to the Attorney General, and five months were required before a decision was taken on whether to order a police investigation. The matter is scheduled to be heard before the Supreme Court on Tuesday, which will examine a request by the Attorney General to lift Mr Sizopoulos’s parliamentary immunity in order to allow him to provide an investigative statement.
As matters stand, the conduct of any criminal investigation against a current or former official for corruption offences depends exclusively on the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General. The Authority’s findings are submitted solely to the Attorney General, who has the final say on whether to proceed with a criminal investigation or prosecution, without any institutional obligation to account for his decision.
The legal community’s warnings
During the discussion of the bill establishing the Anti-Corruption Authority, the Cyprus Bar Association intervened before the then Minister of Justice, Emily Yiolitis, requesting that the Authority be granted extended investigative powers in order to combat corruption effectively.
The Association stressed that otherwise the situation would not improve, citing as examples the findings on the economy and on the Cooperative Bank, which ultimately led to no accountability. No one was punished in connection with the scandals that resulted in the collapse of the country’s economy and the closure of a bank.
The Nikitas letter
Particularly informative is the five-page letter sent on 16 March 2021 by Orestis Nikitas, Chair of the Anti-Corruption Committee of the Cyprus Bar Association, to the then Minister of Justice. Among other points, it stated:
- On 4 March 2021, we received the revised bill and, to our regret, found that investigative powers had not been granted to the independent Anti-Corruption Authority to enable it to fulfil the difficult task assigned to it. This task includes educating the public and private sectors, as well as the wider public, for prevention purposes, and investigating acts of corruption and potential acts of corruption which, under the law, constitute criminal offences.
As the Cyprus Bar Association, we consider it our duty to protect the public interest by intervening and contributing to the State on matters concerning human rights and the fight against corruption. For this reason, we submit our concerns regarding the revised bill establishing the independent Authority, with the aim of ensuring its proper and effective functioning.
- The requirement that the Authority must cease any investigation of complaints once a criminal investigation is initiated by the Police or by a criminal investigator appointed by the Attorney General for acts of corruption or potential corruption contradicts its mission, which includes combating corruption in addition to prevention. Its investigative competence is limited to data collection under Article 6(1)(θ) of the bill. If it suspects corruption offences, it prepares a report and submits it to the Attorney General for action.
It is reasonable to question why a citizen should file a complaint with the Authority, given that it lacks investigative powers, rather than approach the Police directly, risking the contamination of evidence during processing by the Authority’s officials. Moreover, significant delays may arise before any criminal investigation begins, potentially affecting witnesses and leading to the destruction of evidence.
Furthermore, since the Authority’s competences do not affect the powers of the Attorney General and the Police, there is a risk of parallel complaints and parallel investigations, resulting in unnecessary inconvenience and expense.
- It was suggested that granting investigative powers to the Authority might be unconstitutional, potentially conflicting with Article 113 of the Constitution concerning the powers of the Attorney General. Our view is that there is no constitutional issue. The Authority can be granted investigative powers and remain independent without conflicting with the Attorney General’s powers. It could be staffed with criminal investigators specialised and/or experienced in investigating corruption offences. It would conduct investigations, apply to court for relevant orders, complete the evidentiary file and, where criminal offences are identified, request that the Attorney General register the case. If the Attorney General considers the file incomplete, he could issue directions for further investigation, without the Authority being obliged to follow them. The final decision on prosecution would remain with the Attorney General, but given that the Authority would operate publicly and transparently, it would be difficult for any Attorney General to disregard its recommendations. Moreover, its expertise would lead to more effective and faster resolution of corruption offences.
- We fear that if the Authority does not have the power to impose administrative sanctions, or to conduct criminal investigations and forward cases to court through the Attorney General, its recommendations and findings will end up being disregarded, as has happened in the past with various inquiry committees.
- Based on the above, we are of the view that for the Authority to function properly and fulfil its objectives, it must be granted investigative powers to examine complaints of corruption or potential corruption, which by definition constitute criminal offences.
Four legislative proposals to strengthen oversight
Four legislative proposals are currently pending before the House Legal Affairs Committee, aiming to make the Anti-Corruption Authority fully independent and to grant it extended investigative powers:
- The proposal submitted by MP Charalambos Theopemptou on behalf of the Ecologists’ Movement – Citizens’ Cooperation and co-signed by MP Alexandra Attalides on 22 September 2022, which seeks to grant investigative powers to the Authority.
- The proposal submitted by DISY MP Dimitris Dimitriou on 31 October 2024, which aims to convert the Authority into a legal entity under public law.
- Two proposals submitted by MP Irene Charalambidou on 26 February 2026, aiming to amend the current legislation so that, where the Authority’s findings indicate possible involvement of officials in acts of corruption, it may inform the Tax Commissioner without requiring prior notification or consent from the Attorney General.
At present, the Authority’s findings are transmitted exclusively to the Attorney General, on whom the initiation of any investigation depends. If the Attorney General decides not to proceed, those involved are not examined for tax offences or any other criminal offence.
The legislative amendments proposed by Ms Charalambidou seek to establish a clear and institutionally safeguarded mechanism for triggering tax audits, with the objective of strengthening transparency and the effectiveness of the state in preventing and addressing corruption.