When ELAM was founded in 2008, it initially sought registration in Cyprus’s political parties register under the name Golden Dawn, an application that was rejected by the Interior Ministry. Its leader, Christos Christou, a former member of the Greek organisation, made little effort to conceal the connection. In a television interview in 2013, he described his party as the Golden Dawn of Cyprus.
In September 2013, following the arrests of Golden Dawn’s leadership in Greece over the murder of anti-fascist rapper Pavlos Fyssas in Keratsini, ELAM members staged a protest outside the Greek Embassy in Nicosia.
The party secured just 1.08% of the vote in the 2011 parliamentary elections. In a 2013 study published in South European Society and Politics, political scientist Yiannos Katsourides described ELAM as a sister party of Golden Dawn, examining the factors behind the resurgence of the far right in Cyprus.
At the time, ELAM remained firmly outside the political establishment.
From the margins to the mainstream
ELAM’s trajectory reflects a wider European trend. In his 2019 book The Far Right Today, Dutch political scientist Cas Mudde argues that the defining characteristic of the far right’s fourth post-war wave is its integration into mainstream politics and the normalisation of its presence.
In the Cypriot context, political scientist Giorgos Charalambous examines ELAM’s integration into the political mainstream, as well as the party’s adaptations during the economic crisis, in a chapter published in the Routledge Handbook of Far-Right Extremism in Europe (2023). As he notes, six years after entering parliament for the first time in 2016, ELAM had become the fourth-largest parliamentary party and was already well established.
Analysts identify the start of Golden Dawn’s trial in 2015, a year before Cyprus’s parliamentary elections, as a turning point. The timing gave ELAM an opportunity to distance itself from the image of its Greek counterpart, selectively abandoning positions and rhetoric that alienated mainstream voters while retaining its ideological core.
Athens, however, continues to keep its distance. During his visit to Nicosia in October 2025, Greek Parliament President Nikitas Kaklamanis met representatives of six parliamentary parties but left ELAM out of his programme.
From isolation to third place
In 2021, ELAM became the fourth-largest party, securing 6.8% of the vote. In their study of the 2023 presidential election, published in South European Society and Politics, Cyprus University of Technology associate professor Vasiliki Triga and her co-authors noted that the party remained largely isolated from other political forces because of its radical, anti-establishment and often chauvinistic rhetoric.
The results of the 2026 parliamentary elections, however, marked a further shift. ELAM secured 10.9% of the vote, receiving 40,572 votes and doubling its parliamentary representation to eight seats. It rose to third place, pushing DIKO out of a position it had held for years.
Academic literature identifies what is described as ‘institutional tolerance’ as one dimension of the normalisation of the far right. This includes statements by Church officials and government ministers, as well as anti-immigration policies pursued by centre-right administrations. Such developments can create a convergence in political rhetoric that ultimately benefits ELAM ideologically.
Andreas Papacharalambous, a former Strovolos mayor and current ELAM MP, recently described his party in a television appearance on the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation (RIK) as an expression of social liberalism. He also highlighted what he sees as common ground between ELAM and former president Nicos Anastasiades and current President Nikos Christodoulides.
The role of the media
Academic Nicolas Karides attributes part of ELAM’s transformation to the media. In an article published on 4 November, he describes the process as ‘press washing’: the gradual sanitisation of the Cypriot far right by the media, which has helped the party become an accepted part of the political landscape.
Like many of its European counterparts, ELAM has softened its tone and increasingly penetrated centre-right political discourse, Karydes argues, while retaining an exclusionary and nationalist ideology.
He also warns that the party has positioned itself as a potential kingmaker in the February 2028 presidential election.
Its growing institutional influence is already evident in parliament, where ELAM chairs three committees: Defence, Environment and Transport. The allocation was approved with the support of a majority comprising DISY, DIKO and ELAM.
Cooperation without political exclusions
Signs of closer political engagement have also emerged beyond parliament.
In October, six MPs from DISY, DIKO and ELAM formed a parliamentary cooperation group with the pro-Israel Israel Allies Foundation, headed by DIKO MP Chryssis Pantelides.
A few months earlier, ahead of the election of the Speaker of the House, ELAM leader Christos Christou had left open the possibility of supporting Nicolas Papadopoulos in a second round, revealing that contacts had taken place with DIKO.
Political analyst Christophoros Christophorou wrote in June, in a bulletin published by CCEIA, that statements by party officials and consultations over the speakership had demonstrated that some political forces were prepared to reach agreements with ELAM at almost any cost.
On Friday, Nicolas Papadopoulos told RIK that he did not rule out cooperation with ELAM. Sources within DIKO have nevertheless acknowledged that securing the party base’s acceptance of an alliance with the far right would be difficult.
Within DISY, Paphos MP Nikoleta Constantinou told RIK that she did not consider cooperation with ELAM unthinkable. Meanwhile, leadership candidate Giorgos Pamboridis told Alpha TV that he would accept ELAM's participation only in a national unity government with the exclusive aim of achieving a settlement of the Cyprus problem.
The arithmetics of 2028
President Nikos Christodoulides won the 2023 presidential election with 51.97% of the vote, against 48.03% for Andreas Mavroyiannis, a margin of approximately 15,000 votes.
He secured the presidency with the backing of DIKO, EDEK, DIPA and the Solidarity Movement, as well as significant support from within DISY. In the first round, Christos Christou received 6.04%.
Data from the Choose4Cyprus application indicate that Christodoulides was the ideologically closest candidate in the second round for both Christou's voters and those who had supported Averof Neophytou.
The political landscape ahead of 2028, however, has changed considerably. Of the parties that backed Christodoulides in 2023, only DIKO is now represented in parliament. EDEK and DIPA both failed to cross the electoral threshold, each securing approximately 3% in the May elections.
DISY, which finished first with 27.2%, is heading towards an internal contest on 28 November to select its presidential candidate.
If Christodoulides seeks a second term without the backing of either of the two largest parties, his first-round support would effectively be limited to DIKO, the now extra-parliamentary centrist parties and his personal appeal. Securing a place in the second round would therefore depend on attracting voters beyond that base.
With 10.9% of the vote, ELAM is now the country's third-largest party. Together with DIKO, it secured 20.9% in May. In a second round as close as that of 2023, ELAM voters could prove decisive.
DISY, too, needs support beyond its traditional electorate to win a potential second-round contest against an AKEL candidate. May's exit polls recorded the party's largest voter losses to ELAM, at 6%. In a head-to-head contest against Christodoulides, the balance could shift towards the combined support of ELAM and DIKO. This helps explain why some DISY officials have become increasingly reluctant to rule out cooperation with the far right.
DIKO faces the most complicated political calculations. If it backs Christodoulides from the first round, as some of its ministers advocate, and the President subsequently seeks ELAM's support, whether openly or indirectly, DIKO could find itself aligned with the far right. Its room for manoeuvre towards AKEL would also remain limited for as long as it stays in government.
ELAM, meanwhile, may choose to contest the presidential election independently, once again putting its voters in a position to determine the outcome of the second round.
From a party once rejected by the political establishment to one now holding parliamentary committee chairmanships and attracting potential coalition partners, ELAM's transformation is unmistakable. The question ahead of 2028 is no longer whether the party has entered the political mainstream, but how far established political forces are prepared to go in accepting it as a partner.
