The Cyprus problem today is moving within a confrontation far larger than the size and international power of Cyprus. It is no longer only a conflict between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, nor is it confined to discussions with the guarantor powers, with Britain remaining a steady pen holder on the Security Council. It has been incorporated into a broader web of rivalries concerning Eastern Mediterranean security, energy routes, Turkey's relations with the West, the Israel-Iran confrontation, and the shaping of a new regional order.
The role of the UN
The UN continues to provide the institutional framework within which a solution can be recorded and legitimised, but the real negotiation has largely been transferred outside the intercommunal talks table. The issues of governance, territory, properties and political equality can be discussed by the two communities. The fundamental question, however, is now geopolitical. To which sphere of security and influence will Cyprus belong following a possible solution?
Turkey, exploiting the Turkish Cypriot community following its military dominance in 1974, seeks to keep Cyprus within its own geopolitical arc. For Ankara, the island is not simply a national issue or a matter of protecting Turkish Cypriots. It is an extension of the security of its southern coasts, a point of control over sea and air routes, and a strategic tool in its rivalry with Greece, Israel, and the European Union.
Turkey's insistence on "sovereign equality" and a two-state solution is not merely a change of negotiating basis. It constitutes an attempt to convert the military outcome of 1974 into a permanent and legitimate political and international reality. Within this logic, particularly following the Greek Cypriot "No" in the 2004 referendum, the northern part of Cyprus, according to Ankara's hardliners, must remain firmly tied to Turkey, with the aim of functioning as its forward strategic position in the Eastern Mediterranean.
In response to this strategy, Greek Cypriots chose, after 1974, the path of the UN and, particularly after 2004, the exploitation of their status as a European Union member state. Cyprus's accession to the EU did not change the military reality on the ground, but it changed the political and institutional balance. Nicosia acquired a voice in EU-Turkey relations and the ability to embed the Cyprus problem within the broader framework of Turkey's relations with Europe.
At the same time, the Republic of Cyprus built trilateral and multilateral cooperations with Greece, Israel, Egypt, the Emirates, France, and the United States. These cooperations are not limited to energy. They concern defence, security, military exercises, humanitarian operations, population evacuations, and the protection of critical infrastructure.
The escalation of the Turkey-Israel confrontation gives Cyprus even greater strategic importance. Relations between Ankara and Tel Aviv are burdened not only by the Palestinian issue. Their rivalry extends to Syria, Lebanon, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the competition for regional hegemony.
Israel regards Turkey as a major military power with growing influence in Syria and strong political ties with Hamas. Turkey, on the other hand, considers that Israel, with US support, is attempting to reshape the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean in a way that limits its own role.
Within this confrontation, Israel's cooperation with Greece and Cyprus acquires a clear strategic dimension. For Israel, Cyprus offers access to Europe, strategic depth to the west, and a secure environment for energy and defence cooperation, so any proposal for a Cyprus settlement is viewed with scepticism by Tel Aviv. For the Republic of Cyprus, Israel serves as a significant counterweight to Turkish power.
The ambiguous Turkey
Of particular importance is also Turkey's stance towards Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran. Ankara has offered open political support to Hamas and refuses to treat it in the manner in which it is treated by Israel, the United States, and several European countries. This relationship reinforces Israel's distrust and creates serious new rifts between Turkey and the West.
The case of Hezbollah and Iran is different. Turkey is not an organic part of the Iranian axis, nor a stable ally of Hezbollah. It competes with Iran in Syria, Iraq, and the Caucasus. Nevertheless, its hard opposition to Israeli operations and the political support it offers to forces in conflict with Israel create, at certain periods, an objective convergence with Iran and its regional allies.
This behaviour forms part of Turkey's broader, ambiguous stance towards the West. On Ukraine, Ankara supports Ukrainian territorial integrity and cooperates militarily with Kyiv, but at the same time maintains close economic and energy relations with Russia and does not fully align with Western sanctions.
The same strategy is applied in the Middle East. Turkey remains a NATO member and seeks access to European defence programmes, but simultaneously clashes politically with Israel, supports Hamas, and maintains open channels with Iran and Russia. This is not so much unpredictable behaviour as a deliberately transactional strategy. Ankara seeks to draw benefits from the West without accepting full strategic alignment.
France
Within this environment, France has significantly strengthened its presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. Its descent into the region is linked to the protection of maritime routes, its presence in Lebanon, its relations with Greece, Cyprus, and Egypt, as well as the interests of TotalEnergies.
France seeks to present itself as an autonomous European security power, capable of protecting its partners and its economic interests. For the Republic of Cyprus, France's military and political presence serves as additional strategic depth vis-à-vis Turkey.
The role of the major energy giants is also decisive. Chevron, ExxonMobil, Eni, and Total have created strong American, French, and Italian interests in the Cypriot and Israeli EEZ. Their activity transforms the natural gas deposits into part of the regional geopolitics.
Their presence strengthens the international position of the Republic of Cyprus, but does not constitute an automatic security guarantee. The companies are primarily interested in stability, commercial viability, and secure transportation routes. If a broader agreement with Turkey facilitates the exploitation and transportation of natural gas, economic calculations may reinforce pressures for geopolitical compromises.
Bargaining
The Cyprus problem has therefore been transformed into part of a major regional bargain. Turkey seeks concessions from Europe, access to defence programmes, and recognition of its regional role. The EU needs Turkey on Ukraine, migration, and security, but cannot bypass the Republic of Cyprus. Israel seeks to limit Turkish influence, while France and the United States want to protect their own strategic and energy interests.
The real stake is not only the form of a solution. It is the geopolitical orientation of Cyprus. Turkey wants to maintain a permanent strategic say on the island. The Greek Cypriot side seeks a reunified, European Cyprus within a Western framework of interests and geopolitics, something to which Cyprus's accession to NATO could contribute.
The Holguín initiative
The UN can oversee and legitimise an agreement. It cannot, however, alone create the geopolitical compromise that is required. A solution will only become possible when the key regional and international players judge that a new arrangement serves their interests more than the continuation of the current deadlock.
Within this complex geopolitical web, the initiative of the UN Secretary-General's personal envoy, María Ángela Holguín, has limited but not negligible chances of generating momentum on the Cyprus problem. Holguín can open the door to negotiation, but cannot on her own compel the key players to walk through it.
Holguín's most significant asset is the leveraging of the European Union. Her pivot towards Brussels signals that she now perceives the EU as a potential supporting pillar of the effort. The Union can offer Turkey incentives that the UN does not possess, such as economic cooperation, discussion of the Customs Union, facilitations on the movement of citizens, funding, and participation in European security mechanisms.
Herein lies simultaneously the greatest opportunity and the greatest danger. The opportunity is to link a constructive Turkish stance on the Cyprus problem with a positive agenda in EU-Turkey relations. The danger is that the Cyprus problem becomes an object of transaction, in which Ankara demands large European concessions in exchange for only limited moves. This is something that Brussels already understands, and so it does not appear particularly ready to enter into bargaining with Erdoğan, who is, among other things, preparing for elections.
