Who Will Be the Centre-Right Candidate in the 2028 Presidential Elections?

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The battle over which centre-right candidate will reach the second round is expected to be hard and relentless.

By Kritonas Kapsalis

Annita Demetriou is preparing for the next presidential elections, gradually assembling around her a mechanism of officials with political, communications and technocratic experience. Is this enough to establish her as the main candidate of the centre right ahead of the presidential elections? Nikos Christodoulides is attempting, with the upcoming reshuffle as his tool, to enter the final stretch towards the presidential elections and lay the foundations for attracting the kind of broad, catch-all audience he assembled in 2023. Will that effort be as easy as it was in 2023? Is Averof Neofytoupreparing to go before the party base, with Annita Demetriou and Giorgos Pamporidis as fellow contenders, to claim the party's nomination? Can he win it? Diko and its leadership are weighing whether to move with Disy or with Nikos Christodoulides. Could the solution be for Nicolas Papadopoulos to run again? In short, the battle over which candidate from the centre-right space will pass to the second round is expected to be hard and relentless.

Annita

With the constantly repeated refrain that Disy's candidate will be determined by the party base, Annita Demetriou is attempting to build a mechanism alongside the leadership, aiming above all to prevent the leakage of officials to the Christodoulides camp. After Elena Kousiou, who was appointed deputy press spokesperson, Polys Kourousides, who joined the Council for Monitoring Government Work, taking on as adviser the Interior portfolio and in particular housing policy, and Demetris Demetriou, who was appointed special adviser on Public Security and Crisis Management, there followed the appointment of Disy's Famagusta candidate, Paris Markou, as adviser on Defence issues.

These moves show that Annita Demetriou is not confining herself to day-to-day party affairs, but is attempting to create a structure which, when the time comes, will be able to function as the core of a presidential campaign. Of course, this does not appear sufficient to ensure that she passes comfortably to the second round as a candidate. What would most likely establish her as the undisputed Disy candidate, and quite probably the next President of Cyprus, would be a cooperation with Diko from the first round.

Averof

Averof Neofytou is organising as never before and is literally criss-crossing Cyprus, taking part in gatherings and dinners in an effort to correct his mistake of 2023. Back then, he realised far too late that Nikos Christodoulides had managed to capture a large part of the Disy base, leaving him chasing without ever catching up. Today, although Nikos Christodoulides has suffered wear, he still has a foothold in Disy, so no party candidate can rest on the 27% of the parliamentary elections. Averof, as became evident in 2023, has some support beyond Disy, but he would be a certain candidate and a possible president if he had with him from the first round the party of Fidias and Odysseas Michaelides, something he is fighting for, with the team around him not considering such a development unlikely.

The reshuffle

At the same time, Nikos Christodoulides, through a reshuffle that is already overdue, is attempting to take his place on the starting line for 2028, bringing into the Council of Ministers as many figures as he can from the Disy space.

The President knows that to secure his presence in the second round once again, the support of Diko, if he ultimately has it, is not enough, nor can he rely openly on Elam. He needs, in other words, to penetrate Disy to an even greater degree than in 2023, particularly since the parties that formed the original core of his support, DipaEdek and the Greens, have emerged noticeably weakened from the 2026 parliamentary elections.

In a first phase, Nikos Christodoulides attempted unsuccessfully to persuade Disy to align itself with his government, going so far, according to information, as to offer the party the possibility of nominating figures for the Council of Ministers. Disy's victory in the parliamentary elections, however, boosted the leadership's confidence and allowed it to maintain its own autonomous ambitions.

There followed an effort to approach individual officials, with the aim of bringing them into the government and creating the image of a broader movement of forces from Disy towards the Presidential Palace, but again without success.

And so the Presidential Palace moved to plan B. In Disy, the assessment is that a long campaign to undermine the party leadership has already begun, with Annita Demetriou as the main target, since the President of the Republic regards her as his most significant potential rival in the presidential elections.

The confrontation over the extension of Marilena Raouna's term of office is only one episode in this conflict. At the same time, well-known supporters of Nikos Christodoulides are intensely active on social media, frequently launching attacks of a low political level against the Disy leadership and the President's political opponents.

The political scene therefore appears to be entering presidential orbit prematurely. Annita Demetriou is assembling her own mechanism, while Nikos Christodoulides is attempting to broaden his footholds in the space from which he comes. The real battle no longer concerns only control of the centre ground, but above all who will manage to express, or to divide more effectively, the large electoral base of Disy and of the centre right in general.

The difficulty with Elam

This is where Elam comes in. Both the President and the first lady have particular relations with this far-right formation. In 2023 the overwhelming majority of Elam supported Nikos Christodoulides in the second round. Today relations are even better, but the problem lies elsewhere. In 2028 the President does not need Elam's votes in the second round, but in the first round of the elections. To achieve this, he would need to appear in an open political or governmental alliance with Elam, something he cannot do, for four reasons.

First, he needs far more voters than Elam possesses. To pass to the second round he must draw votes mainly from the Disy base and from moderate centrist audiences, such as Dipa, Edek and the Greens. An official identification with Elam would hand Annita Demetriou the argument that Christodoulides has moved outside the traditional European centre right.

Second, it would complicate his relations with Diko. Diko may cooperate occasionally with Elam on individual issues, but an official presidential alliance with it would provoke internal reactions and would limit its ability to present itself as a centrist and institutional force.

Third, there is the Cyprus problem. Christodoulides declares commitment to the agreed basis for a solution, while Elam categorically rejects the bizonal, bicommunal federation and supports a unitary state solution. Elam itself admitted in 2023 that there was a "gap in views on crucial political issues" with Christodoulides.

Fourth, there is the European cost. Christodoulides is investing in the image of a pro-European and institutional President and is pursuing relations with the European People's Party. According to information published by Politis, the image of close cooperation with Elam was already provoking reactions in the European centre right.

In short, Nikos Christodoulides needs Elam's votes, but he cannot appear politically dependent on it. An open alliance would hamper his effort to penetrate Disy, would cause friction with moderate voters and would burden his European image. That is why he is pursuing silent or selective support rather than an official alignment. To win, he also needs Elam; but to claim the Disy space and maintain Diko's solid support, he must not appear to belong to Elam.

Disy and Diko

How much does Disy need Diko in the presidential elections? Disy can elect a President without official cooperation with Diko, but it cannot achieve it on its party percentage alone.

The historical precedent is 2018. Nicos Anastasiades passed to the second round with 35.51% and was re-elected with 55.99%, even though Diko had entered the first round with Nicolas Papadopoulos, who gathered 25.74%. Disy has therefore already elected a President without a pre-electoral alliance with Diko, attracting, however, second-round voters beyond its organised party base.

On the basis of the 2026 parliamentary election results, Disy has a starting point of approximately 27.2%, while Diko stands at 10%, Elam at 10.9%Akel at 23.9%Alma at 5.8% and Direct Democracy at 5.4%. Parliamentary percentages do not transfer automatically to presidential elections, but they show that no candidate can approach 50% without significant movements of voters.

The crucial thing for the Disy candidate, whether that is Annita Demetriou, Averof Neofytou or Giorgos Pamporidis, to name some of those showing interest, is first to pass to the second round. In 2023 Averof Neofytou was left out with 26.11%, because Christodoulides took 32.04% and Andreas Mavroyiannis 29.59%. So even the full rallying of Disy does not by itself guarantee qualification.

In the second round, Annita could theoretically win without the official support of the Diko leadership, if she attracts:

  • the greater part of Disy
  • moderate and pro-European centrists
  • Elam voters who would prefer a centre-right candidate
  • sections of Alma, Direct Democracy and the unaffiliated
  • as well as disappointed voters of the current government.

In short, if Disy could build a strategic agreement with Diko from the first round, its candidate could, leaving Nikos Christodoulides out, pass comfortably to the second round and hold the leading position in the presidential race. In that case, there would also be serious inflows both from Elam and from the new political forces.