There are many who believe that foreign policy is the area in which Nikos Christodoulides has demonstrated the greatest activism. The government presents as achievements Cyprus’ definitive alignment with the West, the upgrading of relations with the United States, strategic cooperation with Israel and the expansion of trilateral partnerships in the Eastern Mediterranean. The institutionalisation of the Cyprus-US strategic dialogue and the continuation of trilateral cooperation with Greece and Israel are indeed tangible steps, and for these Christodoulides deserves credit.
On the other hand, activity is not necessarily the same as strategy, and numerous contacts do not automatically translate into increased power. The critical question is whether this policy genuinely creates advantages for the Republic of Cyprus or cultivates expectations that its partners have never committed themselves to fulfilling.
The western orientation
Cyprus’ gradual departure from the old policy of “sailing in two boats” did not begin in 2023, nor is it the exclusive achievement of the current government. The banking crisis of 2013, participation in an economic adjustment programme, the collapse of the international credibility of the citizenship-by-investment scheme and, above all, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine drastically reduced the scope for a Cypriot policy of equidistance.
Until 2022, Nicosia, with Nikos Christodoulides serving as foreign minister, vetoed EU sanctions against Belarus and maintained weekly communication and consultations with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, however, Cyprus, as an EU member state, was obliged to implement European sanctions against Moscow, while the previous model that linked the Cypriot economy to Russian capital, financial services and naturalisations had already become a massive political burden. Inevitably, Christodoulides did not simply choose the West in a neutral geopolitical environment. He assumed office at a time when the previous ambiguity had become economically, institutionally and politically unsustainable.
This does not diminish the significance of the adjustment, but it does alter its evaluation. It is one thing to formulate a bold strategy and another to present as a strategic triumph a shift that had already become unavoidable.
When the President speaks of the country’s Western orientation, he should also clarify something else. The “West” is not a unified political organisation. The European Union, the United States and Israel may cooperate on a range of issues, but they do not share identical interests concerning Ukraine, Iran, Gaza, Syria or relations with Turkey. Nicosia frequently uses the term “Western orientation” as though it describes a single alliance that will automatically work in Cyprus’ favour. In reality, every capital assesses Cyprus according to its own interests and needs, not according to Cyprus’ interpretation of the regional order.
The real relationship with the United States
The upgrading of Cyprus-US relations is real. A strategic dialogue has been institutionalised, a five-year defence cooperation roadmap has been signed, Cyprus has gained access to US defence sales and assistance programmes, and the National Guard cooperates with the New Jersey National Guard.
At the same time, military facilities in Paphos and Mari are being upgraded with American funding. Officially, these facilities are intended for civilian evacuations, humanitarian operations and regional crisis management rather than offensive military operations. This falls far short of the image of an American base that would serve as a shield against Turkey.
All of this is useful. It does not, however, amount to an alliance guarantee against Turkey. The greatest weakness in the government’s narrative is that it confuses access with protection. The fact that Washington uses Cyprus as a reliable regional hub does not mean it is prepared to bear the cost of confronting Ankara on behalf of Nicosia, nor that it is willing to work towards changing the status quo in favour of the Greek Cypriots.
The Washington-Nicosia relationship remains disproportionately smaller than the Washington-Ankara relationship and recalls the similarly naïve approach of President Makarios when he met US President John F. Kennedy in 1963 believing that the United States would support his decision to challenge the 13 points of the Constitution.
Turkey possesses population size, military power, geographic depth and a critical position linking the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Middle East and Europe. It is a NATO member, controls the Straits, maintains dialogue simultaneously with Russia and Ukraine, influences developments in Syria and possesses a rapidly developing defence industry. Its role in the Black Sea and European defence has grown even more important since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
The sale of 40 new F-16s and the upgrade of 79 Turkish aircraft have already been approved. Turkey’s return to the F-35 programme is not yet certain because of the Russian S-400 system, but at the same time, with American encouragement, a defence pact between Turkey, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia is being signed. The clear message is that the United States can upgrade Cyprus without downgrading Turkey.
And when the interests of the two clash, there is no serious indication that the smaller and more functional relationship with Cyprus will outweigh the strategically more important relationship with Turkey.
How Israel sees its interests
A similar over-interpretation can be observed in relations with Israel. Cooperation among Cyprus, Greece and Israel in defence, energy, civil protection and security is real. It does not mean, however, that Tel Aviv has adopted the exclusion of Turkey from the Eastern Mediterranean as a strategic objective, nor that it will identify itself with Cyprus’ positions on the Cyprus problem.
Israeli priorities are determined primarily by Iran, Gaza, Lebanon, Syria and its own border security. Israel’s reaction to the possibility of a Turkish military presence at bases in central Syria, including Palmyra and T-4 (Tiyas Air Base), demonstrates precisely this point: Israel seeks to prevent a Turkish presence that would come dangerously close to its own security environment.
Israeli strikes were conducted against facilities that Turkey had examined as potential deployment locations.
At the same time, Israel and Turkey have begun discussions aimed at establishing a mechanism to prevent military incidents in Syria. In other words, they compete but also cooperate whenever their interests require it.
Cyprus therefore risks interpreting a temporary convergence of interests as a permanent anti-Turkish alliance. Israel will act forcefully against Turkey only when Turkish actions directly threaten Israeli security.
Europe needs Turkey
A similar picture exists within the European Union. Turkey is currently not a member of SAFE. Its participation is hindered by the absence of a security agreement with the EU and objections from member states, primarily Cyprus and Greece. This, however, does not negate the broader trend or the growing network of bilateral defence agreements.
Europe is seeking ways to utilise Turkey’s defence industry, military capabilities, strategic position in the Black Sea and possible role in a future security architecture for Ukraine. The discussion regarding Turkey’s integration into European defence structures remains open, even if full participation in SAFE has not progressed.
The EU may insist that Turkey fulfil its obligations towards the Republic of Cyprus. At the same time, however, many European governments seek to keep Ankara close to NATO and prevent excessive dependence on either Moscow or Beijing.
A practical division is therefore emerging. The Cyprus problem is treated as an important but specific unresolved issue, while Turkey is viewed as a necessary strategic actor in much larger theatres. For Nicosia, this may be uncomfortable, but it is a reality that must be incorporated into strategy.
The strategic dead end
The fundamental problem with Christodoulides’ policy is not that it strengthens relations with the United States, Israel or European countries. Such relationships are necessary. The problem is that these relationships are often presented as a substitute for, or catalyst towards, a political settlement of the Cyprus problem.
The impression is created that Cyprus can, through bases, military exercises, energy projects and regional partnerships, accumulate sufficient power to force Turkey into retreat.
Some would wish this were true. Unfortunately, such expectations are not supported by the actual balance of power. Cyprus’ major partners will not abandon Turkey, nor will they organise their regional strategies around the Cyprus problem. They will continue cooperating with Nicosia where useful and with Ankara where necessary.
Consequently, a genuinely beneficial foreign policy should transform international relationships into tools for a solution rather than mechanisms for postponing one. Strategic cooperation with the United States and the European Union would acquire substantive content if it were used to restart negotiations, provide specific incentives to Turkey, establish robust guarantees for the implementation of an agreement and connect regional cooperation, for example in energy and natural gas development, to the reunification of Cyprus.
The latest UN initiatives demonstrate that the Cyprus problem remains open, but substantive negotiations continue to face deep disagreements over the form of the solution, political equality and Turkey’s future role. Christodoulides states that he seeks a resumption of talks on the basis of a bizonal, bicommunal federation.
His performance, however, will not be judged by declarations or the number of international contacts, but by whether his alliances generate movement in that direction. Unfortunately, the government is constructing a foreign policy rich in symbolism but limited in effectiveness because it does not bring a solution any closer.
If this contradiction remains unresolved, the foreign policy that Christodoulides proclaims urbi et orbi will not simply prove inadequate. It may prove deeply harmful, even disastrous in the event of a new regional crisis, as UN Secretary-General António Guterres has already warned, because valuable time will have been wasted cultivating the illusion that military-style alliances can resolve for Cyprus a problem that only a bold, realistic and persistent strategy can address.
