By Pavlos M. Pavlou
From the era of the two waves of colonisation in antiquity by Greek city-states to the colonisation of the American continent by European powers in the 16th century, colonisers consistently made three mistakes:
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They underestimated the fact that immediately after colonisation, settlers unconsciously entered a process of emancipation from the metropolis. Distance, particular conditions and the need for self-organisation fuelled this dynamic.
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They underestimated the conditions of osmosis between settlers and local populations, as well as the consequences of colonisation. Spanish and Portuguese settlers, for example, decimated indigenous populations in Latin America, both through brutal behaviour and through the unintentional extermination caused by European viruses unknown in the Americas. As a result, they required more slaves, whom they imported from Africa, further altering the demographic composition.
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In all cases, what appeared as major success and imperial expansion very quickly turned into a factor of collapse for each empire. Settlers became powerful competitors of the metropoles, from trade to culture, contributing decisively to their decline.
Very often, what initially appears as great success is in reality the gravestone of those who “achieved” it, even if they rarely realise it at the time. This does not apply only to colonisers. It applies to societies in general.
The “great successes”
In the 21st century, Greek Cypriots recorded several major successes. For example:
(a) Cyprus’s accession to the EU with the Cyprus problem unresolved. In relation to the Kranidiotis–Simitis–Pangalos planning, this was a distortion, as accession was envisaged in conjunction with the resolution of the Cyprus problem and Greek-Turkish relations through EU processes.
(b) Escape from the conditions of accession and the commitments on Cyprus that accession indirectly entailed: stagnation and gradual hollowing out of the Green Line Regulation, freezing of confidence-building measures, intensifying denunciatory policy against Turkey in the EU and internationally, alliances against Turkey with anyone willing to engage, and other similar practices.
(c) The undermining of every promising effort towards a Cyprus settlement, alongside the weakening of Turkish Cypriots. This was not limited to Crans-Montana. It also included the carefully achieved outcome of 2020, when Mustafa Akıncı lost the Turkish Cypriot leadership, leaving Turkish Cypriots deeply suspicious and cautious towards us. As a result, settlement processes stalled. The caution shown by Erhürman reflects exactly this reality. He does not want to become the third Turkish Cypriot leader to be politically destroyed because he trusted us, especially when all evidence suggests he should not.
Like modern Spaniards
• UN Security Council Resolution 186 of 1964 was a major “victory”. It imposed many conditions, yet ultimately recognised the Greek Cypriot government as legitimate. This gave us wings, not like Red Bull but like a particular species of ant, and we committed every possible folly by disregarding the conditions, until 1974 arrived.
• The preservation of the Republic of Cyprus’s legal continuity after 1974 was another “victory”. We clung to it, carefully separating our future from the achievement of a settlement. This became an even greater “victory” with EU accession without linking our future to a solution. We became a superpower. A solution became even more unnecessary.
• Today, we have created a soft, comfortable cushion for every problem: Turkish intransigence. Whether under Tatar, Erdoğan, or soon Erhürman, it explains everything. Therefore, a settlement is no longer merely unnecessary, but also portrayed as a foolish choice.
All these “successes” constitute the recipe for the collapse of our empire. Like new Spaniards and Portuguese, while we continue to drift in complacency, all surrounding conditions are being assembled for our disappearance.
The “convergences”
Within such a framework, and with the para-state demonstrably dominant in the exercise of power, the desire for a settlement is easily frozen through inversion techniques:
I. “To enter talks, the other side must prove it is not intransigent.” At a time when the other side’s mistrust has been proven justified at least four times, and continuously over the past nine years.
II. “Talks should resume from where they left off, and the UN should record the convergences.” Given that (a) we never accepted the Guterres Framework as a whole, and (b) we refuse to accept a Turkish Cypriot vote in the Council of Ministers and rotating presidency, both of which we had accepted in 2016 and 2017, what exactly will the UN record? Either we will debate convergences for another decade, or we accept arbitration, accepting whatever the UN records. Which do we want?
III. “Confidence-building measures should be announced in a five-party conference after agreement on convergences and alongside the resumption of negotiations.” CBMs exist precisely to build trust so that negotiations become possible. Without trust, negotiations will not start. And if negotiations somehow start, CBMs will no longer be needed.
Tolerance of irrationality
All irrationalities of our side in the 21st century are ultimately tolerated by society. Even those who genuinely desire a settlement wait for conditions to form on their own, without acknowledging that our side systematically violates every logical foundation.
We do not admit, even to ourselves, that the para-state and the Presidency do not seek a settlement. They seek time management without definitive collapse of Cyprus-related activity, until securing a second term.
Because we refuse to acknowledge the obvious, we also fail to accept that the entire world has seen through us. Not only Holguín and Erhürman. Everyone. That is why we feign surprise every time no “hope” emerges from meetings.
Even this surprise does not last long. At most until the next Feidias gaffe.
We have become so accustomed to the absence of expectation that we no longer wish to engage with what could revive it. Two elementary moves from our side could resuscitate hope. But addiction to disappointment, framed as if it has no cause, simply “because the two sides disagree”, is stronger than the desire to create conditions for expectation.
Until the definitive end of our “empire”.
The basket
• Audacity (1): In order to justify not informing even Parliament about the companies and amounts paid into the First Lady’s fund, the Commissioner for Personal Data Protection stated that disclosure would reveal donors’ political preferences. This implies the fund is not charitable but political. If so, why are party donors disclosed by law? Unless parties are not political organisations.
• Audacity (2): Recently, a form of “inauguration” took place for the widening works on the Greek Cypriot side of the Agios Dometios crossing, despite works not being completed. The scandal lies in the fact that for years our side did nothing, despite agreement, claiming no contractor could be found. A justification comparable to that used to turn crossings into a hard border for “security and Schengen”. Then we express outrage when Pakistan criticises us at the Security Council and act surprised when no one believes we want a settlement.
• Audacity (3): Regardless of substantive weaknesses in President Christodoulides’ proposal on recording convergences, it is audacious to raise it nine years after Crans-Montana. He did not raise it as foreign minister, as a presidential candidate, or during three years as president. He proposed it only after Erhürman asked whether he accepts rotating presidency.
Source: Politis Sunday edition